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Abstract
DAVID HILLMAN German Odysseys of the First World War.
Department of History, March 2021.
ADVISOR: Professor Mark Walker

This thesis examines the journeys of four separate German military units away
from the European theater and forced to operate without aid or allies in the Indian,
Pacific, and Atlantic Oceans, as well as in Africa. Each group had a clear goal to
accomplish, to strengthen the German war effort from abroad, either by disrupting,
evading, or diverting Allied personnel and war materiel. To accomplish this, each group
required cunning, discipline, deception, and strong leadership. These odysseys, although
more aptly compared to Xenophon’s Anabasis, demonstrate the global nature of the First
World War, the deterioration of international good will and chivalry towards one’s
adversaries between 1914 and 1919, and the success of unconventional strategies in
evading overwhelming enemy forces while away from the Eastern or Western Fronts.
This thesis specifically examines the journeys of the SMS Emden in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans from the summer of 1914 to November 1914, her landing crew through
the Indian Ocean and Middle East from November 1914 to May 1915, the SMS Seeadler
from her conception in the summer of 1916 to August 1917, and the Schutztruppe in
German East Africa from 1914 to 1918. The leaders of these groups were Karl von
Müller, Hellmuth von Mücke, Count Felix von Luckner, and Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck
respectively.
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Introduction

The First World War is often characterized only by the land war in its European
theater, and does not always cover the global nature of the conflict. This is despite the
longest naval battle and the largest naval battle ship-for-ship occurring during this war,
and the direct conflicts that took place from southern Africa to east Asia, as well as along
the major shipping routes in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans. While the Central
Powers in Europe and the Middle East may have been surrounded by the Allied Powers,
Germany possessed both the second largest navy in the world then, and colonies from
modern Samoa to Togo, although only recently acquired by 1914. As a result of the
sudden escalation of international tensions in Europe between 1st and 23rd August 1914—
when the Russian, British, French, and Japanese Empires began to declare war on the
German and Austro-Hungarian Empires—these German groups had to fend for
themselves to a varying level of success and international attention. However, the
attention paid to these groups abroad works to show the polarization of the two sides over
the course of the war, demonstrating the lost sense of this being a ‘civilized war’ and the
increase of chauvinist feelings in the populations.
When the state of war was declared, the Imperial German Navy’s East Asia
Squadron under Maximillian von Spee was stationed at the German colony of Kiautschou
in China, specifically at the coastal city of Tsingtau, where weeks prior joint German and
British naval celebrations had taken place. The Squadron planned to sail across the
Pacific to the Americas while disrupting Allied trade, then into the Atlantic to Germany
to help the German High Seas Fleet defeat the Royal British Navy in the North Sea, but
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they were defeated at the Falklands, with hundreds of casualties. However, the SMS
Emden, under Karl von Müller had been detached to enter the Indian Ocean to begin
commerce raiding to keep the British Navy occupied and confused at the start of the war.
The men of the Emden were aware that their old ship was likely to be defeated in
a battle with a more modern enemy ship, as she was nine years old at the time, but were
excited by the chance to prove their value to the German war effort by hurting British
trade and prestige. The Emden captured over thirty ships—causing loss of material,
investment, and insurance costs estimated in the millions of pounds. Their success and
strict adherence to the then prevailing rules of war gained the attention of the German and
neutral press, as well as the Allied papers, with one British paper claiming that they
hoped the Emden would be sunk, but that not a single man from the crew should be killed
because of their contribution to naval history. Defeated by the Australian Navy on 9th
November 1914, when thoughts that the Great War may be over by Christmas still
circulated, the international outpouring of respect for the crew and Captain of so
successful a commerce raider continued for weeks, aided by the mystery of the ship’s
landing crew, who had escaped capture and gone missing in the Indian Ocean.
In truth, the landing crew under Hellmuth von Mücke had commandeered the
Ayesha, an old British sailing ship, and made for a neutral Dutch port nearby with the
hope of escaping defeat or imprisonment. When they discovered that the Emden was
destroyed and that German East Africa was surrounded, they opted to return to Germany
through the Ottoman Empire, which had joined the Central Powers by then and offered
the best chance of accessing Europe from the east. To avoid the British and French
navies, the landing crew had to make the Ayesha appear like an incompetent fishing
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vessel, and later the German steamer Choising—with whom they met en route to the Red
Sea—as a neutral Italian ship. In February of 1915, word spread to Germany from the
Ottomans that the Emden’s landing crew had arrived at Yemen to the excitement of the
German and neutral papers, but skepticism from the Allies.
The war continued into 1916, when the inconclusive Battle of Jutland in the North
Sea failed to give either the British or German navies the satisfaction of total victory over
the other. The situation at Jutland resulted in an unbroken British starvation blockade of
Germany, and the resumption of unrestricted U-Boat warfare against the Allies in the
Atlantic. With the cost of the war increasing and coal supplies dwindling, the German
Admiralty chose to deploy a captured windjammer disguised as a Norwegian commerce
ship to slip through the blockade and raid in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The ship,
named the SMS Seeadler by her Fregattenkapitän Count Felix von Luckner, was
provided with false Norwegian letters, books, photographs, nametags, and twenty seven
Norse speaking German sailors to complete the illusion, as well as a hidden area for thirty
seven additional crew members and room for up to four hundred prisoners.
Despite delays and having to adapted to new issues as they arose, the Seeadler’s
disguise worked, and it was able to run the blockade on Christmas Day 1916, beginning
to raid the shipping lanes of the Atlantic as sailing ships had in wars for centuries
beforehand. The Captains of the captured ships were fooled into drawing close to help the
old windjammer, only to discover that it was a member of the Imperial German Navy
once within range of her guns. Although the women aboard the captured vessels were
scared of what the dastardly ‘Huns’ would do to them once aboard, they reported later
that their captors were the epitome of considerate treatment, especially the Captain, who
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often dined and entertained the growing ‘Captain’s Club’ as the Seeadler moved south to
Cape Horn for the Pacific.
Of the Germans abroad, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and his Schutztruppe in the
German East African colony were the only unit in the Imperial German forces to
successfully operate from August 1914 to after the war ended in November 1918.
Knowing that a war between the European superpowers would leave the German colonies
in Africa exposed, von Lettow’s goal was to divert Allied war material away from the
European theater, where the fate of the German colonies would ultimately be decided.
Through the use of guerilla tactics and proper training, the Schutztruppe—who numbered
far fewer than their British, Belgian, and later Portuguese adversaries—were able to adapt
to Allied efforts to entrap them, operating in the colony until the end of 1917. When
trapped on the southern border with Portuguese Mozambique, von Lettow chose to avoid
a conclusive final battle that his force would lose and instead left the German colony,
leading to the Allied and neutral papers claiming success in Africa until they realized that
they would be forced to continue sending men and supplies to east Africa to find the
Schutztruppe.
The treatment of the Emden’s exploits by the global press during the opening days
of the war stands in stark contrast to the opinions held about von Luckner and von Lettow
in 1917 and 1918. The short war that had been planned for by the European governments
and expected by many in Europe proved naïve, and the result was increasingly agitated
populations as starvation blockades, deadly U-Boat warfare, constant death notices, and
the use of less humane weapons escalated. The examination of the Emden, Ayesha, and
Seeadler work to show how the chivalrous nature of successful odysseys gained attention
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for how they contrasted the war in Europe from 1914 to 1917, while the Schutztruppe’s
odyssey in Africa illustrates the scale of the anger at the end of the war, and the
difference of opinion over Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck’s legacy.
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Chapter I: The SMS Emden in the Asiatic and Australian Theaters1

When Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, was
assassinated by Serbian nationalists in Sarajevo on 28th June 1914, a series of previously
established war plans were retrieved by the European superpowers in preparation for a
conflict.2 The German Empire had begun building up its naval power in the opening
decade of the century to compete with the preeminent British Navy in case of such a
struggle, leading to a German-British naval arms race that culminated during the war.3 In
order to control their expenses, the German government started by constructing
economical light cruisers that were named for and co-sponsored by German cities,
leading to the production of ships such as the SMS Karlsruhe, Königsberg, and Emden.4
These three ships ultimately acted as independent commerce raiders in the Caribbean,
western Indian, and Pacific and Indian Ocean respectively in the early days of the
conflict.5 The SMS Emden’s journey became the most well-known across the globe for
the method with which her Fregattenkapitän (Senior Commander) Karl von Müller
conducted warfare, her success as a commerce raider, and the actions of the landing crew
after her defeat. Deep in hostile waters and cut off from allies, the story of the Emden was

“Victory Medal: Definition of Theaters of War; An Army Order,” The Shanghai times (1914-1921), 3rd
November 1919, https://search.proquest.com/central/docview/1324944700/4BD77DFC5B094F80PQ/
8?accountid=14637 (accessed 25th October 2020).
2
John Keegan, The First World War (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 3-4.
3
Alison Graham, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydidies’s Trap? (Boston, MA:
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2017), 75.
4
Gene Zimmerman, “Gallant Last Cruise of the Raider Emden,” Sea Classics 31, no. 11 (2008), 42-9.
5
Dan van der Vat, Gentlemen of War: The Amazing Story of Captain Karl von Müller and the S.M.S.
Emden (New York, NY: William Morrow and Company, 1984), 199-200.
1
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surprisingly well known from the rural communities of Yemen to the streets of Dublin,
New York, and Berlin.
Two weeks after the assassination, the news from Sarajevo reached Tsingtau—the
capital of Germany’s coastal Chinese colony Kiautschou—but colonial life only paused
briefly, to mourn the death of Franz Ferdinand, before returning to inter-European
comradery abroad.6 The general feeling of European colonists in Tsingtau was that the
events taking place half a world away were trivial to their daily lives, although there were
those within the German leadership abroad who stayed keenly alert to news from Berlin.
German naval plans stayed the course until 7th July, when the Emden was ordered to
abandon her trip to Shanghai and remain in the bay at Tsingtau.7
Colonial governor Alfred Meyer-Waldeck and Vizeadmiral (Vice Admiral)
Maximilian von Spee of the German East Asiatic Squadron had been preparing for these
orders from Berlin for weeks, if not months, and began to arrange for the conflict just as
the armies in Europe were doing.8 Once the 1890 Austria-Hungarian cruiser Kaiserin
Elisabeth was brought to Tsingtau, the public began to suspect that tensions were rising
to a concerning degree. However, while still in a state of peace, von Spee had von Müller
provide him with “a careful review of all German naval units in Asia, their precise
locations, and their state of preparedness… he moved his squadron to the Eastern
Carolines without public announcement and asked von Müller to arrange the quiet shift
of a few gunboats operating on the rivers in China.”9 Since Kiautschou was uniquely

6

Edwin Hoyt, The Last Cruise of the Emden (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2001), 33.
Wes Olson, The Last Cruise of a German Raider: The Destruction of SMS Emden (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2018), 10-2.
8
Charles Burdick, The Japanese Siege of Tsingtau: World War I in Asia (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1976), 223.
9
Burdick, The Japanese Siege of Tsingtau, 26-8.
7
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controlled by the Imperial German Navy instead of the German Colonial Office, von
Müller was temporarily put in charge to protect the main city as hostilities between
Russia and Germany accelerated.10
To avoid being trapped by any number of potential foreign enemies—–not unlike
the SMS Königsberg’s later fate in the Rufiji Delta of German East Africa for nine
months from 1914 to July 1915—von Müller chose to sail the Emden out of Tsingtau’s
harbor on 31st July.11 The news of the German-Russian state of war and the Kaiser’s call
for the full mobilization of the German Army and Navy reached the crew of the Emden
via wireless on 2nd August, and many expected the English and French to soon join
Russia against the Central Powers.12 After the news was given to the men, the crew of the
Emden cheered at the chance to show their ability in practice and bring pride to the
Kaiser, including the officers Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant Commander) Hellmuth von
Mücke, Marine-Zahlmeiserapplikant (Deputy Paymaster) Franz Bordeaux, and Leutnant
zur See (Sub Lieutenant) Prince Franz Joseph von Hohenzollern, nephew to Kaiser
Wilhelm II.13 Among their tasks would also be the training of the new recruits that had
arrived from Germany in February 1914.14
The Emden came upon its first prize of a fruitful career near the then-neutral
waters of Japan, the newly constructed and wireless-capable Russian mail steamer
Rjasan. Oberleutnant (Lieutenant) Julius Lauterbach, who was instrumental in training
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van der Vat, Gentlemen of War, 22.
Prince Franz Joseph von Hohenzollern, Emden: My experiences in S.M.S. Emden (London, England:
Herbert Jenkins Limited, 1932), 4-7.
12
Hellmuth von Mücke, The Kaiser’s Raider: Two Accounts of the S.M.S. Emden During the First World
War by One of its Officers (East Yorkshire, England: Leonaur, 2012), 13-5.
13
Franz Bordeaux, Bordeaux Diary and Papers Concerning the Ship Emden, 29 July 1914– 3 January
1915 (New South Wales, Australia: State Library, 2013), 5-6.
14
Burdick, The Japanese Siege of Tsingtau, 10-1.
11
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the prize crews of the Emden and ultimately escaped capture and returned to service in
Germany in October 1915, was sent to board the Rjasan and stop its wireless signaling
after the Emden fired a shell across her bow.15 ‘Prize crews’—the name given to the
group of sailors tasked with boarding the ‘prize ships’ taken by a commerce raider—had
to quickly board and secure the newly captured ship, even more difficult and important
during the First World War because wireless communications made calling for help
simpler and quicker than at any point during the nineteenth century.
Captain Austin of the Rjasan was initially cold to the prize crew until Lauterbach
reminded him that they had been speaking German and drinking beer together in
Tsingtau two weeks prior. This worked to warm relations between captors and prisoners,
and began the rumors of the Emden’s chivalrous and gentlemanly conduct in commerce
raiding that spread internationally during the war.16 It also demonstrated the sudden shift
that the European colonists and militaries experienced from their co-operative and
intermingled lives of general ease to adversaries in a bitter war within a brief period of
time.
Given the speed and abilities of the ship, as well as the dangerous conditions
lifeboats endured in the stormy weather, von Müller chose to risk returning to Tsingtau to
drop off the passenger-prisoners and fit out the Rjasan as an auxiliary cruiser. While en
route to Tsingtau, the wireless operators aboard the Emden discovered that the British had
joined the Russians and French in war against Germany, complicating matters of
resupply and dominance on the seas.17 After arriving at the colony to find no enemy ships
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Hoyt, The Last Cruise of the Emden, 42.
Hoyt, The Last Cruise of the Emden, 42-3.
17
Olson, The Last Cruise of a German Raider, 14-6.
16
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nearby, and waiting for hours as the Emden and Rjasan were led through the newlymined harbor, von Müller began full preparations for naval warfare.18
As temporary protector of Tsingtau, he took stock of the German merchants in the
bay and selected the Prinz Eitel Friedrich as a raider and the Markomannia as a coal
supplier for the Emden, while waiting for the Rjasan to be fitted with the guns and name
of the slower auxiliary cruiser Kormoran.19 With the message that the Emden was to meet
von Spee and the Squadron at the Marianas Archipelago, coal, food, soap, cigarettes,
alcohol, ammunition, and all other essentials were loaded onto the ships, while all nonessential items that may cause additional damage to the crew in a fight were removed on
6th August.20 By the end of the day, the Emden was prepared to meet the Squadron at
Pagan and left Tsingtau, whose governors knew that with Britain as adversaries in the
war—and Japan being the close allies of the British—an attack on the colony would only
be a matter of time.21
Arriving at Pagan, von Müller met with von Spee and the Commanders of the
Squadron to discuss their plan to cross the Pacific and to disrupt British and Allied
shipping around South America.22 Having realized that a war with the international naval
powerhouse that was the British Empire would leave the German Squadron without
friendly ports in which to repair, restock, or hide if damaged, von Spee established the
land-based Ettapes around the Indian and Pacific oceans. The Ettapes were usually
administered by a mid-ranked officer of the Imperial German Navy and covered
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von Hohenzollern, Emden, 15-7.
Burdick, The Japanese Siege of Tsingtau, 41-2.
20
Robb Robinson, “Wes Olson, The Last Cruise of a German Raider: The Destruction of SMS Emden,”
International Journal of Maritime History 32, no. 2 (May 2020), 521.
21
van der Vat, Gentlemen of War, 39.
22
Hoyt, The Last Cruise of the Emden, 61.
19
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“communications, intelligence, coaling and supply… although so much of the Far East
was under the control of Germany’s enemies, there was also plenty of neutral territory,
including China, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines (then American) and other islands
under the United States flag such as Guam and Hawaii.”23 von Spee intended to use the
Ettapes in neutral territories to resupply and evade the numerically and technologically
superior British Navy, since the rules of war dictated that acts of aggression within
neutral waters was strictly forbidden.24
After hearing the plan, von Müller suggested keeping a ship in the Indian Ocean
while the rest of the Squadron sailed east in order to tie additional British personnel and
war material away from the European theater.25 As an older ship that was as well gunned,
armored, or fast as the other members of the Squadron, the Emden was a sensible option
for what would likely be a suicide mission in the Indian Ocean, or ‘the British lake’ as
some then referred to it.26 Just as Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck of German East Africa
understood the German military’s role abroad, von Spee realized that the war would
ultimately be decided on the battlefields of Europe. All that the German Navy could do
was try to tip the scales in Berlin’s favor by keeping Allied soldiers, money, and weapons
stuck in subsidiary theaters for as long as possible. 27
In the German Navy, this was referred to as the “fleet in being” theory, which
held that the simple existence of the growing German Navy posed enough of a threat to
British shipping and power that it could preoccupy a sizable portion of their resources,
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van der Vat, Gentlemen of War, 34.
von Hohenzollern, Emden, 53-4.
25
Hoyt, The Last Cruise of the Emden, 62-3
26
Zimmerman, “Gallant Last Cruise of the Raider Emden,” 42-9 & 64-5.
27
Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, My Reminiscences of East Africa: The East Africa Campaign of the First
World War by the Most Notable German Commander (East Yorkshire, England: Leonaur, 2010), 9.
24
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even if not actively damaging the Allied forces.28 This theory was also held by
Fregattenkapitän Max von Looff of the Königsberg, whose entrapment in the east African
Rufiji River Delta continued to keep British ships and sailors away from Europe in the
longest battle in naval history. von Spee understood that the disruption of British shipping
in the Indian Ocean would take pressure off of the Squadron in the Americas, aid the
German war effort, and severely damage the prestige and confidence of the British
Empire if successful.29 The day after the meeting, when the Squadron set sail for the
Americas, von Spee had the message “Emden detached, wish you good luck!” signaled to
the jubilation of the Emden’s crew, who could now show the world what they were
capable of, and relish in their successes as a naval unit independent from the rest of the
Squadron.30
One of the unique difficulties of an odyssey at sea was the issue of resupply, not
just of food, daily essentials, and—for a commerce raider—ships to transfer passengers
onto for transportation back to land, but also feeding the ship’s constant need of coal, as
most naval ships during the First World War required. The start of the Emden’s journey
to the Indian Ocean was through the Dutch East Indies, which made the evasion of
detection necessary, and thus commerce raiding could not yet begin.31 The result of this
handicap was that the food supply on the Emden and Markomannia began to lose variety,
becoming a daily variant on dried beef, dried vegetables, and rice. Living in a postPotemkin-mutiny world, the officers of the Emden understood the need to properly feed
the crew:
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Olson, The Last Cruise of a German Raider, 21.
van der Vat, Gentlemen of War, 41-2.
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von Mücke, The Kaiser’s Raider, 25.
31
Bordeaux, Bordeaux Diary, 22-3.
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As regards the men’s food, it was our first consideration to procure the
best for them, and to obtain fresh meat at every opportunity, e.g. from the
supplies of the ships we captured later. The respect and preference given
to the men in the question of food is, of course, natural, as they have more
manual work to do than the officers, and therefore in greater need of and
better claim to good nourishment. Adherence to this principle of care for
the men’s food was richly rewarded by the fact that we had few cases of
illness during our cruise.32

Once raiding finally began along the British fishing ships, fresh food became so abundant
that some passengers from the scuttled prizes aboard were surprised by the ‘barnyard’
appearance of livestock and coal dust on the decks on the increasingly famous Emden.33
This included four ‘war cats’ that were born in the officer’s sleeping-quarters one night
and named after the prize ships captured by the Emden, who were looked after by those
crew members off duty at any given point.34
The necessity for everyday essentials besides food, such as soap or alcohol, were
also satisfied through commerce raiding, although only in accordance with the rules of
war as to avoid unnecessary expenses for Germany or bad publicity for the German
Navy.35 For instance, on 9th September when the Emden stopped a ship only to discover it
was the neutral Greek Pontoporus, but the cargo was coal destined for Britain, it was
“legitimate contraband under the international rules for cruiser warfare.” In order to avoid
having to find a port and spend hours coaling from the Pontoporus to the Emden or
Markomannia, von Müller hired the Greek Captain to follow the Emden for coaling until
the supply of Bengal coal ran out.36 This was a quick and fully legal solution to
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von Hohenzollern, Emden, 45-6.
von Mücke, The Kaiser’s Raider, 49-50.
34
Bordeaux, Bordeaux Diary, 30-1.
35
van der Vat, Gentlemen of War, 50-1.
36
van der Vat, Gentlemen of War, 49.
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disrupting enemy trade, upholding the rules of war, and assuring the Emden’s own supply
of Indian coal. However, the Pontoporus followed the Emden for quite some time as
Indian coal—of which it held 6,600 pounds—was the least clean-burning coal, requiring
daily cleaning of the engines and producing massive black clouds of smoke that could
give away the position of the ship.37 This was only to be used as the better Chinese coal
from the Shantung region ran out, and only until a better supply—ideally Welsh coal—
could be captured. This finally occurred in late September when the British Buresk was
caught with 6,000 pounds of Cardiff coal, and was ordered to follow the Emden going
forward.38
Later, on 12th September when the Emden found the ship Kabinga flying under
the British flag but carrying goods destined for then-neutral America, its sinking would
place the expense of the cargo on the German government.39 The solution to the issue that
best helped von Müller was having these and some entirely neutral ships act as
receptacles for the prisoners from the prize ships. Not only did this free crew members
from guard duty and cut down on food consumption, but by accommodating the prisoners
and treating them well, their stories upon return to shore boosted the public perception of
the German Navy.40 This was not the only reason why von Müller treated prisoners well
and released them, but it did help build the myth of the Emden as a chivalrous raider
dead-set on obeying the rules of war and civility around the Indian Ocean, as proven by
the ‘three cheers’ given by former prisoners aboard the Kabinga when it was set free.41

von Mücke, The Kaiser’s Raider, 70.
Olson, The Last Cruise of a German Raider, 44-5.
39
Hoyt, The Last Cruise of the Emden, 90.
40
“When the Emden Raided Penang,” The New York Times, 20th December 1914,
https:timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1914/12/20/issue.html (accessed 25 th September 2020).
41
von Hohenzollern, Emden, 86-7.
37
38
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Coaling was a difficult and time-consuming activity, but necessary for the success
and survival of any ship at war, so the officers became innovative with creating
incentives and evading the enemy while in the act. Since hundreds to over a thousand
pounds of coal may need to be transferred from the Markomannia or other coaling ships
to the Emden, the crew was broken into teams that could work while the others rested.
Thus, it became easy for the officers to incentivize the crew by making it a competition
of who was the fastest and most effective coaling team, the winners of which would
receive extra beer and cigar rations.42 Still, coaling at port was difficult as enemy patrols
were increasingly scanning the British shipping routes, coasts, and shoals for the
Emden—as was her goal. This was at the behest of the local governments, with the
government of New Zealand threatening to resign if their troop transport ships did not
receive an escort on their way to Europe.43
While it slowed the productivity of the coaling teams, even though it could only
be done during clear weather and damaged the sides of the ships, the German light cruiser
did something that many members of the British Admiralty thought impossible or
preposterous: they coaled at sea.44 This process was fairly damaging to the ships involved
as their sides banged against one another and the dropped bags of coal dented the
Emden’s deck—which resulted in the Emden’s only casualty before her final fight, the
leg of Torpedoobermatrose (Leading Torpedoman) Possehl.45 However, the ability of the
Emden and her supply ships to coordinate meeting points and then maintain radio silence
at all times meant their tracking was all the harder for the Allied navies, who were
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increasing their presence in the Indian Ocean considerably, and ultimately earned the
Emden the respect of the British Admiralty.46
To further increase the number of Allied ships sent to the Indian Ocean required
grand action from the Emden, and so von Müller decided to raid the Indian port city of
Madras, which had massive oil tanks within range of their guns. The action took place on
22nd September, and upon arrival the entire city was illuminated to the surprise of the
Emden’s crew given the state of war, making the targeting and destroying of the oil tanks
and military facilities much easier.47 Trying to cast doubt about Britain’s true strength
over the population of India, von Müller specifically avoided damaging any residential or
non-militarily significant targets in the hopes that this may encourage the people of India
to rise against Britain, robbing the Empire of valuable resources and personnel for the
European theater.48
The local papers spoke about the attack for days and acknowledged the success of
the Emden’s action at Madras over the British Navy, which was supposedly the world’s
foremost naval power since the battle of Trafalgar, worrying local British officials about
a panic.49 The night the raid occurred, the people of the city and surrounding area “were
hurrying down to the beach in every possible way that they could… once they realized
what had taken place, and for a couple of hours afterwards crowds of excited people were
busy hurrying to and fro [sic] trying to glean information and discussing the situation.”50
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The destruction of the oils tanks could have been worse had the wind been travelling
differently, but it still cost the Burma Oil Company nearly 1.9 million liters of kerosene,
British-based insurance agencies hundreds of thousands of pounds, and acted as a major
blow to Britain’s global prestige as the Admiralty was forced to shut down shipping
routes less than a day after having declared them safe again.51
With the successful raid on Madras completed, the Emden moved away from the
Bay of Bengal to resume commerce raiding, resupplying, and with luck have a chance to
clean and repaint the ship’s camouflage grey since the scraping while coaling at sea had
damaged it.52 This was all possible at the harbor of Diego Garcia in early October, an
island owned by a British oil company that only received news via mail every three
months. As such, the owner of the company came out to receive the German ship—the
first that he had seen since 1889—and ask them for the news of the world. He received
answers about “world manœuvres” and the death of Pope Pius X, but no direct reference
to the state of international Anglo-German relationships.53 Naturally, when the British
Navy arrived at Diego Garcia later to see if the Emden had been spotted to the
bewilderment of the men on the island, the British newspapers ran wild with the amazing
story while the Admiralty fumed.54
After their stay at Diego Garcia, commerce raiding was resumed west of the
Maldives while moving towards Penang for yet another daring harbor raid, although this
was made easy by the prize ships’ Captains asking questions such as “how did you learn
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of the new and secret course laid out for merchantmen?”55 Hearing that there were
Russian and French vessels at Penang, a critical point on shipping in the area, von Müller
believed that a quick assault at dawn could prove devastating to the Allied ships. In order
to trick the other ships in the harbor, von Müller employed a fake fourth funnel conceived
and built by von Mücke to make the Emden look British.56
The Emden arrived in the Penang harbor on 28th October with the fourth funnel up
and the war flag lowered until moments before her torpedoes—of which Franz Joseph
von Hohenzollern was the officer in charge —were fired on the Russian cruiser
Zhemchug at 5:18 am.57 The destruction of the Zhemchug was swift and completed within
minutes, exacerbated by the lack of leadership after a large portion of the officers and
crew abandoned ship at the very start of the attack.58 No small part of the Emden’s
success came from the enemy’s Captain, who “was not aboard at the time; having
ordered the torpedoes disarmed, the ready ammunition stowed except for the twelve
rounds, and the fires out in all but one of the sixteen boilers, and having failed to set extra
watches or darken ship.” The failure was so severe that a later naval court in Vladivostok
stripped the Captain and First Officer of their decoration, their ranks, and their status as
members of the Russian nobility.59
While the Emden was unable to do too much damage to enemy commerce in the
harbor during her brief period there, von Müller did halt a ship on his way out to explain
why the Emden had not stopped to pick up Russian survivors and offered his apologies
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for firing at a civilian ship.60 Afterwards, the Emden spotted the French destroyer
Mousquet, which was quickly fired on and defeated, although it continued to return fire
briefly afterwards, and the Captain—having lost his legs in the attack—ordered his men
to lash him to the bridge so he could honorably pass with his ship.61 The story of Penang
spread across the world, with American newspapers such as The New York Times
publishing firsthand accounts of the battle in December about von Müller’s conduct,
since his “‘refusal to sing [sic] unarmed vessels while the crews were on board, his
refraining from bombarding the town, his stopping to pick up the crew of the Mosquet…
at once made him ‘that gentleman, the Captain of the Emden.’ On all sides you heard ‘I
hope they sink the Emden, but it will be a shame if any of her crew are lost.’”62 The
article was published a month after the Emden was sunk and demonstrated the fascination
audiences around the world had with a modern light cruiser conducting itself with
gallantry, which was coming rapidly to an end on the European continent during the First
World War.
With a successful career raiding, the bombarding of the oil tanks at Madras, and
now the obliteration of a Russian cruiser and a French destroyer, von Müller chose to
move along from Penang to west of Sumatra, towards the British wireless station on
Direction Island.63 The importance of long-range wireless stations was understood by all
sides going into the conflict, allowing information from Windhoek and Tanga in
Germany’s African colonies to reach Berlin, or for the British Navy in the Indian Ocean
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to communicate to London through South Africa.64 Since Germany had so few wireless
stations abroad that could withstand British attacks for long, von Spee had begun
outfitting German merchant vessels with ‘Telefunken’ wireless transmitters.65 By doing
so, the issues caused by a lack of fixed wireless stations could be offset by
communicating through traveling—albeit shorter ranged—‘stations’, which would have
to be hunted down by the British Navy.
In contrast, the British Marconi transmitters were on relatively few merchant
vessels at the time, and since the Emden operated independently of the Squadron and
Berlin, it need not break radio silence while still listening for merchant chatter to locate
prizes and evade Allied warships.66 This proved especially helpful to the Emden since the
British Admiralty had captured a copy of the German Navy’s codebook earlier in the war,
however while “justifiably concerned about possible leaking of its ability to read German
signals, the [British General] Staff were indeed less willing to pass things on than perhaps
they should have been.”67 The ability to listen in on foreign communications, which
revealed information about changes in shipping routes and the identities of coded British
Navy call signs, without giving away their own position was a large part of the reason
why the Emden was so successful at commerce raiding.
The Emden arrived at Direction Island, the north-eastern most island of the
Keeling Island group, on 8th November, but delayed the attack until 9th November while
von Müller waited for the Buresk and their new coaler Exford to meet him at a designated
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point. He was also waiting for the HMAS Sydney to leave the area by listening to its
weakening radio signal, although the call sign ‘NC’ led the Emden’s crew to assume it
was the HMS Newcastle.68 The British wireless station on the island was responsible for
three underwater cables that linked South Africa, Australia, and the Dutch East Indies, so
von Müller planned to disable the station and have his wireless team aboard message over
the airwaves to block out an SOS from the island.69
Kapitänleutnant von Mücke was put in charge of the mission, as von Müller
thought that a bombardment of the station could be easily repaired if the cables were not
properly broken up, and put together his landing party of fifty of the Emden’s nearly four
hundred man crew. In addition to the men “von Mücke commandeered all four of the
Emden’s portable machineguns… he also selected twenty-nine rifles and twenty-four
revolvers. The men took the guns apart, cleaned them thoroughly, oiled them, and broke
out new boxes of ammunition.”70 The Germans expected the station to be prepared for
such an undertaking as theirs and anticipated having to go up against nearly a hundred
men, but only fifty from the crew could be spared at the time.71 While the landing crew
was taking the wireless station, destroying the cables, and detonating the transmitting
tower, more Emden crew members were spread across the Buresk, Exford, Pontoporros,
and Marine-Zahlmeisterapplikant Bordeaux was put on the Markomannia with his
journal.72
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On the morning of 9th November 1914, over three months after the Emden had
first left Tsingtau, the attack on Direction Island began while the Emden’s wireless
operators tried to signal over the station’s call for help. However, the Australian light
cruiser Sydney caught part of the message about a strange ship and was sent to investigate
the issue. The Sydney was detached from the nearby Australian convoy that was escorting
the New Zealand troops en route to the European theater, the very same escort that the
New Zealand government had demanded out of fear of the Emden’s antics in the Indian
Ocean.73 Since the ability to triangulate the location of wireless messages was not
discovered until later, the convoy’s wireless operators signaled one another at reduced
strength, which appeared to the Emden’s operators as over two hundred miles away,
instead of the actual fifty.74 When the Sydney approached over the horizon it was
originally mistaken for the Buresk, which had been called in by the Emden once the
harbor was deemed safe, and thus not regarded as a threat until it was too late to recall the
landing squad.75 All that von Müller could do was to leave the harbor and clear the decks
for their final battle.
The conflict lasted about an hour and a half, from 9:38 am to 11:11 am, despite
von Mücke’s account in 1917 that it lasted most of the day, which he would not have
known since he was unable to see the majority or end of the conflict from his location.76
The Sydney was built in 1911, five years after the Emden, and had the advantages of
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larger and longer ranged guns, plate armor, and a faster top speed.77 However, the rangefinders on the Sydney failed to accurately utilize the longer-ranged nature of their guns at
the start of the conflict, allowing the Emden to fire successfully into the Sydney and
disable her automatic aiming devices, although the plate armor prevented further
significant damage before she sailing out of the Emden’s range.78
What followed was a scene of carnage as the Sydney’s range-finders began to find
the mark, taking out the communication channels and tubes near the start of the battle and
pummeling the Emden with dozens of shells over the course of the entire conflict.79 The
men of the Emden continued to fight as they were torn apart by wood and metal shrapnel
with each hit, leading to cases after the battle where seventeen year old boys had to
choose between either having their arms amputated, or never seeing their mothers
again.80 In the case of the engine stokers and von Hohenzollern—a torpedo tube officer—
the early hits destroyed their ventilation systems. The result was that stokers had to work
overtime in 152°F heat while toxic fumes began to fill the air, and von Hohenzollern and
his men continued to stand ready for action even as the water level rose above their
knees.81 Had it not been for the torpedo hatch, the Kaiser’s nephew and his men may well
have drowned in 1914 after the armored hatch had become damaged and unusable.82
While the Imperial German Navy and its officers held that having the ship go
down honorably was always the correct course of action, von Müller realized that this
would mean little since only a single gun was still operational, and most of the gun-crews
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were already severely wounded or dead.83 Instead, he believed that the best course of
action for the ship’s crew was to run the Emden aground on the nearby reef and hopefully
save the remaining men. John Glossop, Captain of the Sydney, fired a few more shells
into the Emden to ‘silence its last gun that continued to fire’, before turning his attention
to the Buresk, the Emden’s prize-turned-coaling ship captained by Lauterbach. He had
been watching the battle for an opportunity to intervene and help the Emden, but having
found none retreated. Not wanting the British to capture the Buresk, the crew began the
process of sinking their own ship before leaving for the Sydney as prisoners of war.84
The crew of the Emden was in a far more precarious state. When they first ran
aground, von Müller had allowed members of the crew to abandon ship and swim for the
nearby beach; harder than it sounded as many died when the waves battered them against
the jagged coral or sucked them under. The remaining crew set to work putting out the
fires as the doctors administered morphine to those most severely injured, and as the
officers began disabling the guns, flooding the magazines, and destroying the code books
to make them unusable before the Sydney returned.85 It took the Sydney four hours to
return to the Emden, during which time the captured prize crew leader Kapitänleutenant
der Reserve (Lieutenant Commander of the Reserve) Klöpper had informed Glossop that
von Müller would never surrender, ultimately leading to a fatal miscommunication
between the crews of the winner and the wreck.86
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Upon returning, Captain Glossop noticed that the German war flag was still flying
and signaled to ask if the Emden were still an enemy combatant or not, as the rules of war
declared that a ship remained hostile until the flag was brought down. The signalman of
the Emden replied that they had no codebook and could not understand the message, but
both sides claim to have never received a response to their original messages.87 Having
heard that the von Müller would not surrender, and seeing that the German war flag still
flew, Glossop ordered a second round of shelling on the wrecked ship, restarting the fires
and killing more crewmen. Realizing the mistake, von Müller ordered his runner Arthur
Werner to take it down and fly the white flag. He climbed the mast—all the while shells
whizzing past and blowing the Emden to hell—and managed to take down the flag.88 It
was burned by order of von Müller to keep it from becoming a trophy of the three year
old Australian Navy, who had just scored their first major victory over an enemy that
day.89
The battle had ended, but since night was falling and trying to transport the
injured from the Emden or the beach to the Sydney would be difficult enough with proper
light, both crews had to remain where they were for the meantime, during which several
additional men died.90 Glossop did care about his adversary, and sent a personal letter to
von Müller asking for permission to help the Germans in any way possible, and over the
course of the following day they were brought to the Sydney where the doctors of both
ships began several continuous days of surgery.91 The crew of the Emden were now
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prisoners of war, and although treated very kindly by the men of the Australian Navy
while aboard, they would reside in abysmal conditions in a prison on Malta until
repatriation in November 1919, five years later.92 All the crew, that is, except for those
that had been on Direction Island during the battle, and who had disappeared during the
night while the Sydney and Emden were at the reef.
The end of the Emden’s adventures did not stop the public’s continued interest in
her exploits and daring, with articles involving first-hand accounts of the Madras and
Penang raids coming out for weeks and months after she was beached.93 While the
Emden had only operated for the first three months of the war, her engines “had made ten
million revolutions, and we had put thirty thousand nautical miles behind us, with a coal
consumption of 6,000 tons.”94 During that time the crew had intercepted over thirty ships,
they had re-coaled at sea and in unaware enemy harbors, utilized new wireless
technology to narrowly evaded their pursuing adversaries, and caused millions of pounds
of damage and insurance expenses to British trade and insurance, as well as irreparable
harm to its prestige.95 With all of that, the public of Germany, neutral, and even Allied
nations were bound to be interested in the crew and Captain of such a ship, even after
their imprisonment.
After the battle concluded, the Sydney signaled to the British escort—uncoded—
that the Emden had been sunk, and news traveled quickly to Britain and Australia. The
London Times expressed joy that the Emden had finally been sunk, but also claimed that

92

von Hohenzollern, Emden, 291-2.
“When the Emden Raided Penang,” 20th December 1914.
94
von Hohenzollern, Emden, 199.
95
R.K. Lochner, The Last Gentlemen of War; The Raider Exploits of the Cruiser Emden (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2002), 284.
93

30
they hoped von Müller would enjoy a long life and visit London, so that they could
celebrate his success and bravery as a nation filled with those who appreciate daring
additions to the history of sea warfare.96
The news quickly reached the Allied nation of Australia as well, where a letter
from a stoker aboard the Sydney was published in The Morning Bulletin on 6th January
1915. It recounted the experience of the battle, and included a word about the Emden’s
landing crew, and how the day after the battle, the Sydney “landed an armed party at
Cocos and found out that the German landing party had cleared out in a schooner they
had commandeered.”97 Despite this escaped group of German sailors, the destruction of
the Emden by the HMAS Sydney brought considerable joy to the people of Australia
because it was the first victory of the newly-formed Australian Navy.
In Germany, the news of the Emden’s final battle was mourned, but its wildly
successful career commerce raiding and the raids on Madras and Penang were celebrated
in German newspapers for weeks. Emden’s city council wrote to Kaiser Wilhelm II to
express how “deeply grieved by the destruction of Your Majesty’s glorious ship [they
were]… and by the large number of casualties which must be mourned by that sinking.”98
In return, the Kaiser gave his condolences to the families of the crew members of the
cruiser, and promised the city of Emden that the Imperial German Navy would build a
stronger Emden II to honor her success and service, which was completed and launched
in 1916.99
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Newspapers in neutral nations had also lamented the end of the Emden’s
adventures in 1914, with the Norwegian Aftenposten in Oslo praising the intelligence and
far-sightedness of von Müller to accomplish what he had given the odds stacked against
him.100 However, nine months after the battle in May of 1915, the German journalist
Emil Ludwig wrote two articles for the German paper Berliner Tageblatt—which was
then used in newspapers for interested publics around the world—after meeting von
Mücke in Al Ula, Arabia to outline his journey. The articles recaptured the interest of
nations around the world, and in America the articles included photographs of von Müller
and von Mücke, as well as an artist’s rendition of the Emden, and a map of the landing
crew’s journey after encountering the Sydney.101
The news of the landing crew’s return had restoked interest in the Emden’s tales.
America was still neutral at that time, but the public had an interest in matters of naval
warfare then since Britain was supposed to be the global seafaring power. Even so,
German raiders such as the Emden in the Indian and Pacific, as well as the SMS
Karlsruhe and Prinz Eitel in the Atlantic, continued disrupting and evading the British
seemingly everywhere. In some cases, Germans ships even stayed in then-neutral
American ports such as Hampton Virginia for periods of weeks to repair and continue
their missions.102
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As unrestricted submarine warfare began, and after years and millions of lives
were lost on the battlefields of Europe, Asia, and Africa, the ideas of chivalrous warfare
and respecting a noble enemy began to dry up. Allied opinion of the German Navy
soured, with America entering the war partially because of the sinking of the Lusitania by
a German U-Boat (Unterseeboot), but von Müller and the crew of the Emden were not
demonized like the rest of the German military. The Australian and the British-owned
Chinese newspapers continued to write about the noble and powerful crew of the Emden
in order to increase the reputation of their own navies that had defeated it.103 Instead, the
Allied failures in German East Africa, and to a much larger extent the destruction on the
Western and Eastern Fronts had replaced the nationalist zeal globally, and the crew of the
Emden was slowly forgotten.
While the men of the Emden were suffering in a ghastly and severely
undersupplied prison camp in Malta, Käpitanleutnant von Müller was suddenly relocated
after he had become vocal about the camp providing his men with basic human
necessities.104 It was reported in a Canadian newspaper that he was repatriated from
Holland to Germany in October 1918 as his health had been deteriorating from a bout of
malaria he had picked up serving on the 1892 German light cruiser SMS Seeadler in
German East Africa before the war, which eventually caused his death in 1923.105
However, even at that late stage of the war, the German people and German
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government—with exceptions—saw von Müller as a war hero, and awarded him
Germany’s highest military honor, the Order Pour le Mérite.106 His death was mourned in
the Weimar Republic as the loss of a man who had served dutifully and upheld his
position with honor, prioritizing the lives of his crewmembers over the German Navy’s
expectation of never giving up the ship.
The journey of the Emden was celebrated in several different ways, including
decorations such as the Iron Cross First Class or Iron Cross Second Class for all of the
crew members, the Kaiser commissioning the Emden II with Iron Crosses to signify the
courage of the original, and two or three further ‘Emdens’ over the following forty years
and three governments.107 Even after the city of Emden decided to stop this practice, the
people of Germany and Australia continued to honor the legacy of their navies during the
First World War at the site of the Emden’s final battle. In 2014, representatives from each
government came together with the descendants of both crews to commemorate the
centennial anniversary of the battle. While they were there to mourn the loss of life in a
truly global conflict, they took solace in the fact that today the two governments hold
friendly relations and collaborate to make the world a more peaceful place to avoid any
similar conflict in the future.108
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Chapter II: The Crew of the SMS Ayesha in the Pacific and Middle East

As the men aboard the SMS Emden’s broken decks prepared for their final night
of freedom before five years of imprisonment, the Emden’s landing crew set sail for the
Dutch East Indies port of Padang.1 The landing crew was led by Kapitänleutnant
(Lieutenant Commander) Hellmuth von Mücke, the First Officer to Fregattenkapitän
(Senior Commander) Karl von Müller, and was composed of fifty men, including fully
“armed men with machine guns and demolition charges, and two wireless operators who
could identify the right kit to destroy… Leutnants Schmidt and Gysling, thirty seamen
(all ‘nine-year men’ careerists, who hoped to one day be promoted to petty officers or
further), and seventeen technicians.”2 The destruction of the Emden by the HMAS Sydney
while the landing crew was away provided the crew with a new mission in the war,
different from the Emden’s task to disrupt Allied trade in the Indian Ocean; to uphold the
fleet-in-being theory, thus diverting Allied resources from the European theater. Not
wanting to become prisoners for the remainder of the war, the landing crew chose to
return to the service of the German Empire by any means necessary, utilizing scant
resources, guise, cunning, and discipline to rejoin the German Navy regardless of any
obstacles.3
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The first job of the squad was to neutralize the British long-range wireless station
on Direction Island, which was of vital Allied importance by connecting Batavia (Dutch
East Indies), Perth (Australia), and Mauritius (west of Madagascar) via underwater
cables.4 The guns of the Emden, while dated compared to other naval vessels at the time,
were more than enough to stop the station’s wireless messaging, but von Müller decided
against this to save ammunition and in the hope that a quick surprise attack at dawn could
take the station before they had the chance to react.5 On 9th November 1914, von Mücke
and his men set about demolishing everything related to wireless operations, and
unfortunately a seismograph after misidentifying what it was. Through it all, the British
stationed there were forthcoming with information, and a certain level of friendliness was
displayed when the British asked the Germans to topple the radio tower away from the
tennis courts and were obliged.6
However, the destruction of the underwater cables was a more difficult task,
requiring they be located, dredged up, chopped apart, and then brought far enough out
into the harbor so that they could not be easily retrieved and repaired after the landing
crew departed. Only two of the cables, and none of the hidden backups, were destroyed
by the time the Sydney approached the island, responding to a signal from the station that
got through the German wireless jamming.7 While von Mücke and his men tried to return
to the Emden they were too late, withholding fifty valuable men from the Emden’s
already light crew at the time, and were forced to go back to the island and prepare for

Hellmuth von Mücke, The Kaiser’s Raider: Two Accounts of the S.M.S. Emden During the First World
War by One of its Officers (East Yorkshire, England: Leonaur, 2012), 95.
5
Sams, German Raiders, 118.
6
Edwin Hoyt, The Last Cruise of the Emden (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 1966), 146-7.
7
von Mücke, The Ayesha, 7-8.
4

36
the Sydney’s return after fighting the Emden. While the well-armed Germans may have
been able to repel a landing by the Sydney’s crew, the ship’s guns would have quickly
defeated them as they were even better than the Emden’s, so von Mücke thought of
alternatives to death or imprisonment.8
The answer was a “three-masted schooner anchored in the lagoon. The 97-ton
Ayesha… had been employed on the food run to Batavia until a regular steamship service
made the vessel redundant… upon returning to shore [von Mücke] ordered Leutnants
Gyssling and Schmidt to take a party to the schooner and prepare her for sea.”9 While the
ship was old and the hull fairly rotten, it was the best chance that the Emden’s landing
squad had for evading death or imprisonment, and so they prepared the ship for a run to
Padang. The British, who initially tried to explain to the Germans that this would fail,
eventually came around to the challenge and actively helped by showing where exactly
“provisions and water were to be found, urging them to take the freshest supplies. They
brought pots and pans, water, oil lamps, old clothing, and blankets to the schooner. They
provided pipes and tobacco. They were also generous with advice, particularly
concerning the course to follow.”10 Since the little ship was built for a crew of five to six
men and not the fifty that were to take it over one thousand seven hundred nautical miles,
the supplies and information provided by the British was crucial to the initial success of
the smallest ship in the Kaiser’s Navy.11 That night, the crew of the SMS Ayesha sailed
west out of the harbor, to indicate that they were off to help Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck in
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German East Africa, while actually sailing over the horizon and then for the German
consul at Padang.
Life aboard the Ayesha was difficult despite having far more crew members than
were necessary to operate the ship. Firstly, the Ayesha’s top speed was eight to nine
knots, unlike the Emden which often cruised at eighteen and could achieve twenty when
needed. This did provide an opportunity for the older officers, who had learned to operate
a sailing ship in their early careers, and former fishermen among the crew to teach the
rest the ropes, so they learned “to set sails, and—more important—to mend them. The
Ayesha’s canvas was old and rotten, and von Mücke was afraid to put much strain on it,
so they traveled slowly and conservatively.”12 There was also the issue of drinking water
when it was discovered that three of the four tanks were contaminated by salt water. The
solution was to have the crew gather sails and funnel rainwater into receptacles for later
use, which worked well enough and gave the crew an opportunity to bathe on deck when
it rained.13
The crew made do with what they had for everything. The ship’s cooks used some
of the iron ballast in the hold—used to weigh a ship down into the water when the hold
was empty, as was the case with the Ayesha—to increase the size of the cooking surfaces
and prepare meals for everyone. Most of the men slept in the hold under a sail at first, and
thus began to busily “work at making hammocks out of old ropes which they untwisted,
out of twine, and out of old sail cloth torn into strips… these hammocks were swung
wherever a place could be found for them, and afforded the occupants relief from the
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rather violent motion of the ship.”14 Some things were irreplaceable however, including
the single comb that the whole crew had to share, a razor blade that required skill and
patience on the rolling waves, and their clothing that was quickly deteriorating to the
level of old dishrags.15
The major issues occurred when storms or other ships came up over the horizon,
giving the small, slow sailing ship little time to prepare for the encounter. During a larger
storm, the sails had to be furled to keep them from being torn apart and stranding the men
in waters filled with British, Australian, and other Allied ships all searching for the final
group from the Emden. This fear was almost realized on 21st November, when “at 2100 a
thunder squall swept in. Because of an operating error the mizzen topsail landed on the
gaff arm and tore; now it hung useless. Salvage was impossible in the squall.”16 The
storms could have easily stopped or even destroyed the Ayesha, which would have served
the British Admiralty well as they and the French were desperately trying to find the crew
members after being tricked that they were making for German East Africa or the SMS
Kӧnigsberg along the African coast.17 The Ayesha managed to reach Pedang, and once in
the territorial waters of the neutral Dutch on 27th November von Mücke had the German
war flag raised to signify that they were members of the Kaiserliche Marine in
accordance with the rules of warfare.18
After arriving at the harbor, the crew of the Ayesha had to strictly follow the rules
of a warship, which meant that they could only stay in the neutral port for twenty four
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hours, could only receive those items from the port that would not ‘increase their fighting
capabilities’, and could neither leave the ship nor allow anyone aboard without
permission.19 While trying to move closer to the other German vessels in port—such as
the Choising—questions of her status as a proper warship were raised. This came to a
head when “the Dutch told Mücke that his ship would be treated as a prize. The ensuing
row lasted all day, with the Dutch neutrality officer, a naval lieutenant-captain,
sympathetic but the harbormaster, a Belgian by birth, doing his best for his embattled
mother-country by trying to strangle the Germans in red-tape.”20 The Ayesha was finally
declared a warship with the help of the German consul, who also illegally smuggled
supplies of chocolate, cigarettes, German newspapers, and other luxuries from the larger
German ships to the Ayesha, with a letter detailing a rendezvous with the Choising near
3°20'S, 99°20'E.21
While en route to the meeting area, the Ayesha was first met by two German
reservists who had seen her in the harbor and wished to join the crew, and since they
were outside the territorial waters of the Dutch at the time von Mücke accepted them.22
The journey was relatively quiet, except for the 9th December when a freighter with no
flag was spotted coming towards the Ayesha. When asked to identify themselves by the
armed ship, von Mücke chose to act as an incompetent fisherman, and “took four signal
flags that were close at hand, arranged them one above the other, tied knots in the two top
flags so no one could tell what they were, and then hoisted the signal up the mainmast so
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it was half hidden by the sails… [the freighter] turned away.”23 The disguise had worked
well to make them seem like incompetent fishermen, and the Choising was met near the
rendezvous spot on 14th December. Due to poor weather conditions, the transfer of men,
munitions, and materials had to wait until 16th December near the island of South Pagai.24
The Ayesha was scuttled, but not without proper respects paid by the crew for the little
ship that had carried them a total of one thousand seven hundred and nine nautical miles
through storms and doldrums alike.25
The Choising had been assigned by the German East Asiatic Squadron as a
coaling ship for the Emden on 25th September, and was sent near Mozambique for the
Emden if needed until fires in her holds of coal required that she leave. She went to
Padang for repairs from 11th October to 9th December, when the German consul secretly
messaged her the coordinates given to the Ayesha’s crew and the Choising left to take
them on.26 Information from the English papers thoroughly dashed the Germans’ plans to
join the SMS Kӧnigsberg or von Lettow in German East Africa, since the Kӧnigsberg
was trapped in a stand-off up the Rufiji River Delta by Allied ships, and von Lettow had
disappeared into the jungles to wage guerilla warfare.27
While filled with problems of her own, which was significant given the extent of
the fire damage, von Mücke planned to get the Choising to Hodeida in Yemen after
reading in the newspapers that the Ottoman Empire had been fighting against the British.
Since the Ottoman Empire offered the Ayesha’s crew a chance to return to service in
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Germany directly—and most other options were either sunk (the Squadron), stuck (the
Kӧnigsberg), had fallen (Tsingtau), or were surrounded (German East Africa)—they set
course for Constantinople. They held that if they could make it to Hodeida, which they
believed had a railway that connected to Constantinople based on information from an
old guidebook of the region, then it would be easy enough to get to the capital and then to
reach Berlin.28
Since the British and French navies were more than likely to be found in the area
of the Suez Canal and Red Sea, especially while at war with the Ottoman Empire, von
Mücke chose to disguise the Choising to slip past their blockades. As a slow, 1,657-ton
freighter of the Norddeutscher Lloyd shipping company, the Choising would have to be
repainted from its identifiable “black hull, white bulwarks, and ochre brown
trimmings.”29 With the use of a book of English ships and those that had been sold to
foreign nations, the crew chose to disguise the Choising as the 1,700-ton Italian owned
Shenir from Genoa, since Italy was still neutral until the end of 1915.30 The most crucial
part was the Italian flag, of which the Choising had none. Therefore, the crew sewed
together “a strip of red, and a strip of white bunting… the men who had artistic ability…
were soon hard at work painting Italy’s coat of arms upon the white strip… we added
some yellow paint to a pot of blue… until the desired shade of green was produced, and
then dipped the green part of the flag into it.”31
With the disguise complete, the crew set off for the Perim Straits near Yemen,
celebratied a modest Christmas and New Year’s on the ship along the way, and arrived at
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their destination on 5th January 1915, although without charts of the area. The French
cruiser Desaix was seen near the harbor, so von Mücke chose to have the crew of the
Ayesha take the rowboats to shore on the outskirts of Hodeida, in case it was occupied by
the French, while “the Choising was blacked out and hugging the coast to avoid being
silhouetted… [she] remained unseen by the British gunboats and was able to slip past and
land outside Hodeida the following day.”32 After a tense meeting with the local Arabic
troops, and realizing that the language barrier was going to be a regular issue for the
German crew, the Kaiser’s profile was finally recognized on a German coin and the crew
was invited to Hodeida with great celebration as the allies of the Ottoman Empire.33
Still believing that the final stretch of their journey would be easy—and since the
French were taking a greater interest in the Choising—von Mücke dismissed it to help
coal the Kӧnigsberg, which had raided along the coast of east Africa and evaded the
Admiralty for months, but was spotted up the Rufiji River Delta and caught in a stalemate
with the British Navy.34 However, von Mücke began to learn that the journey through the
crumbling Ottoman Empire would not be as easy as he had thought for a combination or
reasons. These included the civil strife and banditry along the roads, difficult climate and
terrain, and the fact that the closest station on the Hejaz railroad to Constantinople was in
Al Ula, several hundred miles up the Red Sea.35 Meanwhile, the Choising was
confiscated in 1916 by the Italian government when it declared war on the Central
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Powers, and was sunk on 15th May 1917 in a battle with the Austria-Hungarian torpedoboat destroyers Csepel and Balaton in the Adriatic.36
The longer the crew of the Ayesha stayed in Hodeida, the more that they began to
realize that their Turkish hosts were trying to keep them there. It is likely that the Turkish
officers in the city wanted to keep the Germans, who carried pistols, thirteen rifles, and
four Maxim machine guns, to help them with the Arabic population that was beginning to
revolt against their Turkish masters. The Turkish officers began to build special barracks,
and offered money and Turkish uniforms to indebt the Germans into their service, and
finally “Lieutenant-Colonel Kadri… told Mücke to his face that the detachment was now
under Turkish command and demanded a report of events aboard the Emden and after,
[but] the German had had enough.”37 Informed that travel by land from Hodeida to Al
Ula was impossible given the danger on the roads, and with the Choising departed, von
Mücke chose to move east to the region’s capital Sanaa, where he was told the climate
was better and that he may have a chance of travelling north-west to Al Ula. Leaving
behind the doctor and those from the crew that were too sick with malaria contracted in
Hodeida to travel, the crew of the Ayesha left for Sanaa on 27th January.38
The journey to Sanaa was made on camelback, which was a harder experience to
some than others among the German crew, particularly those who had never learned to
ride horseback, let alone a camel through a desert. Bandits were occasionally spotted, as
were the ancient castles of the Middle East among the mountains, but the journey itself
was void of any major disturbances, although it had plenty of delays as the men fell off
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and had to wrangle their animals. Many camels were needed for both riding and
transporting food, water, the ammunition, and all other materials, thus professionals had
to be brought, paid, and supplied for the journey as well.39 It was at Sanaa, after a grand
reception for the famous landing crew of the Emden, that they lost faith in their Turkish
allies.40 They discovered that “no camels or riding animals were available for the next
phase of the journey, and that [they] were required to remain in the city to strengthen the
garrison. [The] Emden’s first officer accepted that he couldn’t go on without transport,
but… resolved to return to Hodeida as soon as everyone was sufficiently rested.”41 This
would prove difficult however, since eighty percent of the crew became sick—
decimating the quinine supply to combat malaria—and after the Germans had run out of
money with which to procure supplies and transportation animals.42
The solution came in the form of a retired Turkish general who, worried that the
coming revolt by the Arabs would result in all his money being lost, gave it to the
Germans in return for a receipt to be paid by the Imperial German government at the end
of the war. When his heirs demanded that the receipt be redeemed in 1925, it became the
issue of the new Weimar Republic since it was an official purchase by the imperial
military, and not by von Mücke as an individual.43 After two weeks in Sanaa the crew of
the Ayesha travelled back to Hodeida, but with the intention of returning to sea via two
zambuks—local sailing ships—that were secretly prearranged by von Mücke while en
route with an anti-British Egyptian guide. Returned and reunited with the crew members
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that had been left behind to heal, the local leaders planned a feast that provided the
perfect opportunity for the crew to secretly depart for the city of Qunfudhah up the Red
Sea on 14th March.44
To get there, each zambuk carried about thirty men, as they had some Arabic
workers on board to help them sail the vessels, with the larger of the two being used for
the sick and to house the majority of the medical supplies.45 The other materials were all
evenly divided in case one ship was captured or sunk as they passed through another
British blockade between Qunfudha and their secret launching point just north of
Hodeida at Yabana. When moving through the area where the blockade was supposed to
be, the wind died down to reveal that von Mücke’s zambuk was in the middle of the
blockade’s line and had no means of quickly moving forward.46 Writing about the events
of his travels on the Emden and afterwards in 1917, von Mücke claimed that he had
chosen to leave near the end of the week as he “was sufficiently familiar with the English
customs to know that gentlemen are disinclined to work during the week ends… and
nothing did, in fact, come in sight during the entire day.”47 Once through the blockade, he
describes the monotony of life on the zambuks eating different variants of mutton and
rice, or occasionally fish that they got from local fisherman by trading goods.48
The two ships continued to Qunfudhah, but the jagged coral reefs throughout the
area were difficult to navigate, and eventually the larger of the two zambuks signaled that
it was in distress. With night approaching, von Mücke’s zambuk realized the severity of
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the issue and set out their small canoes to collect the ill and bring them aboard the now
very crowded smaller ship. Those who could not swim well, which did exist in the
German Navy, donned life jackets and paddled to the ship, desperately trying to find it in
the darkness. To help them, von Mücke lit a fire on the ship to keep the torches lit, fired
off flares for them to follow, and had his men yell so that they could all be located in the
darkness, regardless of if the enemy might hear them.49 There were no casualties of the
zambuk’s sinking, and after diving the next day the machine guns, pistols, and some
ammunition were able to be retrieved, but the medical stores were lost, and to fit
everyone aboard the ship, provisions for only three days could be kept due to weight.50
Purchasing a larger zambuk from some locals along the way, the crew reached
Qunfudhah, and after resting sailed on to Leet on 24th March, where they discovered that
the next city of Jiddah was entirely blocked off by the British.51 It was also in Leet that
the crew of the Ayesha faced its first casualty, Matrose (Ordinary Seaman) Wilhelm Keil,
who was buried at sea with all honors.52 After more feasts in honor of the landing crew of
the Emden, von Mücke prepared to travel by land to Jiddah with about ninety camels to
carry the crew, their food, water, ammunition, and to mount the four machine guns on
with two in the front and two in the back in case of Bedouin raids, which were common
in the area.53 With them went a couple also travelling to Jiddah and several gendarmes—
similar to local police officers—and for several long days of riding no issues arose.
Eventually, they reached the dangerous stretch of the trail that was terrorized by a group
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on the outskirts of Mecca that called itself ‘Father of the Wolf’, at which point the crew
saw several Bedouins watching them from afar.54
Since Bedouins were not known to fight during the day, and so few had been
spotted the night before, von Mücke decided to go down the line of camels and inspect
the crew while a day’s march from Jiddah on 31st March, only for a long sharp whistle to
signal the start of the crew’s hardest obstacle during the journey home. Always prepared
for a fight, the Germans brought down their camels carrying the machine guns and
opened fire on the surrounding Bedouins while the others covered them with the thirteen
German and thirteen Turkish rifles at their disposal. When the initial volley ended, von
Mücke moved the crew forward to discover that they were surrounded by nearly three
hundred Bedouins. Without orders being given, the German sailors fixed bayonets and
ask their leader when he would call the charge.55 Hellmuth von Mücke led the charge to
the left of their position, followed by forward and ending on the right since the back had
already been abandoned by the Bedouins, carving the Germans a 1,200-meter no-man’sland between the two parties with only a single German wounded from the whole
ordeal.56
Within view of the sea, von Mücke wanted to make for it so that they were not
surrounded by the enemy, but the Maxim machine guns were impossible to operate on
the move, so he organized the camels and men into columns to move forward while being
less easy to hit. As soon as they tried to move however, the attack resumed, killing
Matrose Rademacher, mortally wounding Leutnant Schmidt, and taking down one of the
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rear Maxim camels which thus stopped the entire crew’s forward movement.57 With night
approaching, von Mücke had the men set up defenses, with the camels brought down
mostly in the rear while the bags of coffee, jerry cans, and sand were used to create two
walls, one exterior and one interior where the wounded and doctor were located.
Trenches were dug within the walls to make motion safer, and areas established for the
Maxims to operate for when the Bedouins attacked, but nothing could be done about
exposure to the elements in these conditions.58
A representative of the Bedouin forces came to the Germans’ defenses and met
with von Mücke to discuss a settlement after which the surrounded Germans would be
allowed to pass to Jiddah. The ceasefire, done through the couple accompanying the crew
until they defected to the Bedouins, had several requirements:

The demands were that we surrender all arms and ammunition, our
camels, all our provisions and water. In addition we were to pay eleven
thousand pounds in gold… [von Mücke retorted] ‘In the first place we
have no money; in the second, we are guests of the country—get your
money in Djidda [sic]; thirdly, it is not customary with Germans to
surrender their arms.’59
The Bedouins’ response was a renewed attack on the crew of the Ayesha, who similarly
repelled the Bedouins with Maxim and rifle fire, but unfortunately the stoker Lanig died
of his wounds due to the lack of medical supplies.60 With no way forward or back, this
was to continue for three days, and eventually the only remaining gendarme was sent at
night to get help from Jiddah.
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The water cans had been buried in the sand to prevent their being shot, and every
man was given a small cup in the morning and at night to conserve the dwindling supply.
Even still, the heat of the day could reach as peaks of 95°F, much worse in the direct
sunlight, making the barrels of the guns literally blisteringly hot when touched.61 The
sand was also an issue, with men having to shovel it out of the trenches almost
constantly, while everyone had to deal with it entering mouths, ears, eyes, noses, and
most importantly, the guns. Constant cleaning was required, and cloths were used to keep
sand out of the muzzle of the guns between Bedouin attacks.62 Even then, the black
beetles attracted by the rotting camel carcasses—whose putrid smell after baking in the
sun and bursting open was not escapable—were by the thousands. Any time one was
killed, another would appear, crawling over the men at all hours of the day and night, and
particularly dangerous to the wounded as they carried tetanus bacilli with them, causing
lockjaw.63
The morning of 3rd April, von Mücke began to plan a break for Jiddah as water
and ammunition were running out, which would have meant leaving the wounded behind,
but by midday, the men of the Ayesha heard rifle fire in the distance while the Bedouins
and Germans still picked at one another. Soon all firing stopped, and the envoy returned
with a new offer that all “previous demands were withdrawn on the proviso that they now
pay £22,000 in gold for safe passage. Von Mücke believed that a relief column from
Djiddah [sic] was responsible for the distant firing, so stalled for time before eventually
declining the offer.”64 After the envoy departed, more volleys fell on the crew, followed
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by silence and tension, with the men very carefully—and over the course of many
hours—kneeling, standing, and checking the surrounding area for the Bedouins, who had
vanished.65 Two representatives of the Emir of Mecca arrived, followed by Abdullah, the
second son of the Emir with seventy men with elegant clothes and supplies, and with no
defensive capabilities whatsoever.66
Abdullah claimed to have come when he got the news of the trouble a day away
from Jiddah, and promised to escort them as allies to the city with a short rest in the
middle now that they had dispersed the Bedouins. As the crew of the Ayesha left the
remnants of their fortress, the Bedouins swarmed over it for anything left of value,
making von Mücke incredibly suspicious of this son of the Emir. When speaking to
Abdullah, he complimented the men’s guns, who offered them to him for examination,
revealing that none of the guns had been fired.67 Whatever the case may be, they reached
Jiddah to jubilation on the crowded streets, glad to put the past three days behind them.68
In Jiddah, the sick and wounded were cared for while von Mücke discussed how
he would get from the city to Al Ula by way of Al Wejh, the closest point on the—still
incomplete—Hejaz railway. He was told that travel up the Red Sea would be impossible
because of the British blockade, but after the Bedouin attack and von Mücke’s unease
with the son of the Emir, they devised a plan. He secretly purchased another zambuk
while “news was spread that they would be travelling by camel to try and draw attention
to the desert and away from the sea lanes. During the night of 8-9 April, they stole out of
the harbour and proceeded by coastal shallows… They reached Serm Munnaiburra on 28
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April, which lay 10 nm short of [Al Wejh].”69 Once there, they chose to travel by land to
the city and rested for two days before their final march through the mountain region
owned by an unfriendly sheik to Al Ula.
Escorted by the sheik from Al Wejh, the crew of the Ayesha was determined to
make it to the head of the railway regardless of anything or anyone in their way. Every
night they set up defensive perimeters, even while still in friendly territory and while
assured by their sheik that all would be taken care of by his men.70 As they went, more
and more of his followers joined them, always scouting the areas ahead and prepared to
defend the Germans, who themselves were prepared for a fight, although the sheik of the
following territory turned out to be preoccupied with a war to the north. In von Mücke’s
conversations with the sheik from Al Wejh, he found the man very interested in German
technology, particularly the range of the Emden’s guns over long distances and his
binoculars, so von Mücke promised to send him a pair from Germany.71 On the final day
to Al Ula, von Mücke rode ahead so that he could organize the arrival of his men and a
train to take them to Constantinople as quickly as possible, although some parts would
have to be marched along the road between stations. It was here that, on 7th May 1915,
they met German reporter Emil Ludwig who asked von Mücke which he would prefer
first, a bath or Rhine wine, and he responded, “‘Rhine wine.’ The decided answer.”72
The Emden had been defeated on 9th November 1914, and her coaling ship
Exford—with Julius Lauterbach aboard, who would later escape prison in Singapore and
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return to Berlin by travelling eastward—was captured on 2nd December, revitalizing the
media’s interest in the story of the Emden and her crew.73 Speculation about the landing
crew’s whereabouts continued, most strongly within the British Admiralty after they
missed the Ayesha at Pedang by a matter of days. However, news from the Yemen
region’s capital Sanaa arrived at Constantinople on 8th February, and the Ottoman
government sent it directly to their German allies. The German government and people
were amazed at the journey the landing crew had made, and expected them to reach the
Hejaz railway by mid-February, leading to Emil Ludwig’s deployment to Al Ula to
receive the increasingly-famous crew of the Ayesha.74
The news began to spread, not only in Germany and neutral nations such as
America at the time, but even within the British Empire and nation despite governmental
attempts to censor such material. One article allowed through by the censors was from
the Dublin newspaper The Irish Times—then still part of Britain—which spoke about the
myths of the escaped German crews of the SMS Emden and SMS Karlsruhe in the
Atlantic, whose crew had already secretly returned to Berlin:
“The child-like faith in the improbable which the German Government
fosters, and its people develop with such docility, has its own revenges,
and this is one of them. A little shaking of their implicit confidence and
blind hero-worship will educate the German people towards the grand
disillusionment which awaits them… Many earnest people at home were
so profoundly shocked by our own bogus heroes that it is consoling to find
that this kind of roguery knows no parties, even in wartime.”75
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The article, titled ‘Bogus Heroes’, was published on 5th May 1915, two days before Emil
Ludwig received von Mücke and the crew of the Ayesha in Al Ula, and a few weeks
before the news spread around the world that the small band had made it from the Cocos
to Constantinople.76
When the men reached Al Ula, they were able to bath, eat, receive proper medical
care, and boarded the Hejaz railway for Damascus and Constantinople beyond. The
journey to Constantinople was a new kind of challenge, the kind where they had to work
through a feast at every stop and fit the gifts they were given by the German and Turkish
populations of the area in their cars, previously filled with only tattered uniforms and
their weapons from the Emden.77 They were given new uniforms so that they would look
presentable, and an opulent invitation-only feast was prepared for them by the German
consul, with even the French delegation choosing to attend and congratulate the men,
particularly on the Iron Cross that they had each been awarded by the Kaiser.78 On
Whitsunday, 23rd May, their train reached the head of the railroad at Haider Pasha, and
with their tattered flag of the Imperial German Navy still flying, the men moved through
the crowd to meet their superior officer, when von Mücke stated “I report the landing
squad from the ‘Emden,’ five officers, seven petty officers, and thirty men strong.”79
The tale of the Emden and her landing crew were not quickly forgotten, either by
the people of Germany or the Allied and neutral nations during or after the war. In a
cinema in Boston one year after the sinking of the RMS Lusitania, but a year before
America entered the war on the side of the Allies, German film reels were being shown to
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a fairly bored crowd. However, the entire theater suddenly stood up and began to cheer,
at which point the author realized that “it seemed quite the natural thing that my own
brogans should be joining in the tumult of applause… It was no shadow swashbuckler we
were applauding, but—so complete the illusion—a very real hero of flesh and blood [von
Mücke]… now young Ulysses marched off the quat at the head of his squad.”80 While
Boston had a large Irish population, and fairly anti-British at that, there was also a sizable
German population, one whose members expressed views of pride in their former
homeland, while also lamenting that “‘if we only had more of the Mückes and not so
many of the Hindenburgs… perhaps this war would not have made so many people hate
the Germans.’”81
The success of the crew’s journey was something that interested people across all
political persuasions during the First World War, since, regardless of what side one was
on, the feat that the crew of the Ayesha had accomplished was an incredible one that
could have failed at any number of times. American audiences were especially interested
in the tale, even after they entered the war against the Germans in 1917, and a book deal
that von Mücke had made with a German company in 1915 was to be published in
English in Boston.82 The deal was made with an American publisher before it entered the
war, but well after public opinion of the German Navy had soured due to the unrestricted
submarine warfare in the Atlantic, showing that the story of this particular journey was
still well regarded enough to be worth the investment.
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Reviews of the book after publication were still positive, describing in July 1917
how the English language version of von Mücke’s The Ayesha was “an exceedingly
interesting little book. It is interesting in the first place as a record of gallant and perilous
adventure, in more ways than one a veritable wonder-voyage. And it is interesting as a
personal narrative, for the gayety, humor, and briskness with which the story is told.”83
This was three months after America entered the war against Germany, and even when
the conflict was well over, the American interest in his tale continued into the 1920’s.
After returning from the Ottoman Empire, every member of the crew reenlisted, many of
whom perished before the end of the war, making von Mücke’s account one of the only
ones about the journey.
Afterwards, von Mücke entered politics to some success, obtaining a cabinet
position in Saxony in 1929, but only in a split cabinet where he, a member of the NSDAP
at the time, had to work together with the socialist and communist members.84 He
quarreled with each group he joined, including the “German National People’s Party, and
then the National Socialist German Worker’s Party (the Nazis).”85 The sale of his book
and lectures in Germany and America provided him a certain level of financial
independence, although not without controversy. At one such lecture in 1922, American
veterans’ organizations protested one of his speeches as they felt five years was still too
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soon for an enemy hero to be speaking to an American audience.86 In many articles
published in America over a course of twelve years, he was introduced as the leader of
the famous landing squad of the Emden, implying that it was still somewhat remembered
by 1930.
For the people of Germany, the crew of the Ayesha and their determination to
evade capture or defeat was a sign of hope during the war. Having come from an already
internationally famous and well-respected German commerce raider, the landing crew’s
trek from Direction Island seemed ludicrous to all outsiders, including the British of the
wireless station, the Dutch at Padang, and the Turkish in Yemen. Regardless, the group
continued across the Indian Ocean and up through the Middle East, much to the chagrin
of the Allied navies searching for them and one particularly unlucky Irish Times
newspaper writer. The men utilized the scant resources at their disposal well, whether it
was a rotting sailing ship, a coffee sack and jerry-can fortress, or the Maxim machine
gun, but relied most heavily on their ability to adapt to new situations. Most had never
sailed before, but by the end had sailed thousands of miles between a late-nineteenth
century English schooner and multiple Arab zambuks. They also learned to ride camels,
subsist on a diet of rice and mutton, collect rainwater using sails, and overcome difficult
climate, storms, and diseases.
The story of their adventure and arrival at Al Ula spread around the world and
seems to have genuinely captivated the interest and respect of many people
internationally. The Central Powers used them for propaganda to show that they could
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overcome any odds, the Allied nations had to admit—as they had for Karl von Müller and
the late Emden—that this was an impressive feat, and the people of America seem to
have been as impressed as the Germans were. While von Mücke’s right-wing political
career dampened his personal prestige after the war, the journey of all fifty members of
the Emden’s landing crew—who spent six months travelling with minimal external aid
and surviving only day-by-day—was an incredible feat of determination, cunning, and
resourcefulness, seen surprisingly more often during the First World War than one might
expect.
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Chapter III: The SMS Seeadler in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans

Almost one year after Hellmuth von Mücke and the landing squad of the SMS
Emden celebrated the completion of their six month journey from Direction Island to
Constantinople, the Imperial German High Seas Fleet and the British Royal Navy’s
Grand Fleet met for the largest battle in naval history. Both sides claimed victory after the
battle because the British had suffered higher casualties—both sailors and ships—and the
Germans had failed to break through the blockade of the North Sea. One result of this is
that two separate names for the battle are used in each country today, the Battle of Jutland
in Britain, and the Battle of Skagerrak in Germany.1 In Germany, the morale boost from a
successful battle with the world’s greatest naval power was short lived as the blockade
remained and the war seemed to have no end in sight while the Allies coordinated
simultaneous pushes on the French Somme, Russian Poland, and Italian Isonzo.2
While artillery continued to bombard and tear millions apart, the dwindling
domestic resources and blockade took their toll on the populations of the Central Powers,
especially after the potato crop failure of 1916 resulted in Germans eating animal feed to
survive the winter.3 To try to break the blockade, unrestricted U-Boat warfare was
resumed by Germany—alienating supporters in neutral nations such as the United
States—and the High Seas Fleet stayed near the northern ports to save the diminishing
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coal supply. As the British Navy starved Germany and German U-Boats began to starve
Britain, the Germany Navy created additional commerce raiders in the Atlantic and
Pacific out of domestic German shipping vessels. The plan was to divert British ships
from the North Sea, but the Germans needed ships that could run the blockade, would
succeed in raiding afterwards, and would not risk the limited coal stock.
One solution was a wooden, three masted windjammer constructed in Glasgow at
the end of the nineteenth century named the Pass of Balmaha, which had been captured
by a U-Boat in 1915 and whose crew was interned in Germany for the duration.4 In the
age of dreadnaughts and biplanes, the Pass of Balmaha and all sailing vessels were
becoming relics of the past, mostly hired by private companies because they could pass
through storm-ridden areas such as Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope quickly, if
they had an experienced Captain and crew. Sailing ships were also cheaper than a coal
powered ship in stormy conditions since rougher waves required steam ships to use
additional expensive coal stocks.5 Without coal and with a crew of only sixty four, the
Pass of Balmaha was approved for a mission to run the blockade under the guise of a
neutral Norwegian ship sending timber to Australia, although there were several in the
German Admiralty that were against the idea in a war with submarines and torpedoes.
The first issue was finding a Captain for the ship, one who had experience with
old sailing vessels, was an officer in the German Navy, and would be confident enough to
attempt this strange undertaking. Count Felix von Luckner was the Kaiser’s personal
choice for the job. The story of Count Felix von Luckner’s life through 1919 could fill
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several books, and with the help of Lowell Thomas it was in 1927 for English speakers to
incredible success, although it included several of von Luckner’s personal
‘aggrandizements.’ Lowell Thomas was a well-known author as a result of his articles
from the First World War, when he was following T.E. Lawrence in the Middle East.6
While worthy of mention, the story of con Luckner’s life before 1911 should be taken
with a grain of salt as a result of his tendency to embellish his tales for the sake of
entertainment, of which he was internationally renowned, giving speeches for decades
after the First World War ended including a boat party in the Hudson in 1926.7 The
accounts from 1916 to 1919 have been evaluated with information from documents, ship
logs, and others’ diaries to show a clearer version of von Luckner and his escapade
during the latter half of the war.8
Felix von Luckner was the great-grandson of Nicolas Luckner, who created his
own group of Hussars that fought well during the Seven Year’s War and were later
bought by the King of Hanover. After a disagreement between the two, Luckner became
a Marshal of France, only to be executed during the French Revolution when he asked for
his pay from the new government.9 His family did well, becoming Counts in Germany to
the Kaiser, but young Felix von Luckner was terrible at studying and schoolwork,
eventually running away to Hamburg to be like Odysseus and explore the seas. With
help, he got a job cleaning pigs on a Russian vessel, and went from job to job around the
world, most notably claiming that he spent time boxing in Australia, fishing in the
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American north-west, cooking on a ship around the Falklands, learning Norwegian along
the way, and eventually finding himself in Jamaica with no money and two broken legs.10
At that point, he saw the SMS Panther and, after meeting some crewmen who helped
clean him up, he decided it was time to return to Germany, study diligently, and become
an officer in the German Navy. With help from his uncle, he passed his exam and
returned to his parents for the first time in eight years, showing he was alive and dressed
as an officer no less.11
Once in the service, Kaiser Wilhelm II had a dinner with Count von Luckner and
his officers, and arranged for von Luckner to be assigned to the Panther on its voyage to
the Cameroons—then a German Colony—after hearing his tales.12 While there, von
Luckner went big game hunting and met a girl that he planned to marry back in Germany,
but this was postponed when the Panther returned for a scheduled crew rotation and was
told to delay departure in July 1914.13 He was reassigned to the SMS Kronprinz of the
Kӧnig class battleships, an improved dreadnaught launched on 21st February 1914, which
was renamed SMS Kronprinz Wilhelm on 27th January 1918, and scuttled at Scapa Flow
on 21st June 1919.14
Aboard at the Battle of Skagerrak, von Luckner saw the HMS Indefatigable
disappear after her magazine was hit, and while he did not speak about it as often as his
other adventures, he did say that one could “see how its armoured body is torn in pieces
and swirls into the air, like everything has been liquidized… The huge oil content of the
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ship belches upward and spreads out, burning, over the water’s surface. Into this burning
sea are hurled the glowing last remnants of the ship, hissing as they land.”15 He had seen
the full force of the two navies, so when he was offered a position on the SMS Mӧwe—a
commerce raider that mastered disguise on the high seas and had returned to Germany
through the blockade—he agreed knowing the danger that he faced.16
However, while in a bar in Hamburg before it relaunched, he was given a letter to
report directly to the Admiralty, who informed him that they were going to use a
windjammer called the Pass of Blamaha to run the blockade and disrupt Allied shipping
alone in the Atlantic and Pacific. Count von Luckner accepted in a manner as dignified as
he could, but was ecstatic at the idea of being a commerce raider, and on a sailing ship
like the ones he had served on for so many years as well.17 He went to the dock where it
was being fitted with two, five hundred horse-power motors in case the wind was bad,
diesel—which was far less critical to the navies of the world than coal—and room for
sixty four crew members and four hundred prisoners in relative comfort.18
Espionage was an increasingly critical factor in strategic planning during the war,
especially for the Germans after their naval code book was captured by the Allies at the
very start.19 Count von Luckner chose to disguise the Pass of Balmaha as the Malette, a
Norwegian ship that was docked in Copenhagen at the time and looked incredibly similar
to his new command. In order to cover his bases, von Luckner took a train to
Copenhagen, where he used the name Phylax Luedicke to pretend he was a shipyard
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inspector and get a better view of the Malette.20 Since the Captain and First Mate were
away while the ship was being fitted with a donkey motor, von Luckner set out under
cover of night, cut the ship loose while the guard to the Captain’s quarters was asleep,
and then snuck in after the guard left to secure the ship. After a frantic search, Luedicke
found the real Malette’s logbook under the Captain’s mattress, then slipped out, helped
retie ship, and disappeared into the night to return to his Malette.21
To keep things secret, von Luckner oversaw the renovating of the ship under the
name von Eckmann, explaining to those fitting it with bunks and supplies that she was for
cadet training, and trying to explain away the strange choice of ship to onlookers as
budget restraints.22 His disguise and the ruse of the new wooden training ship worked
well, save one nosy old sea Captain who took an interest in von Eckmann, especially
after overhearing the mysterious officer collecting two letters for Count Felix von
Luckner.23 The old Captain, acting out of patriotic duty to the Empire, reported von
Eckmann to the authorities, who first stopped him on a train to Bremen. They certified
that von Luckner, who looked like von Eckmann, was the genuine article, but the idea of
a spy in his hotel made von Luckner concerned that the mission had been compromised
by the Allies.24 He was then arrested in Hillman’s Hotel, only to convince the authorities
that he was von Luckner, then arrested again in a restaurant which caused such a scene
that the police had to protect him from the diners who wanted to kill the spy as they left.25
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One call to the German Admiralty later and all was sorted out, and the old sea
Captain chose to stop bothering von Eckmann. Nevertheless, the work on the Pass of
Balmaha’s crew and cover story were just beginning. The Norwegian Malette was only
supposed to carry a crew of twenty seven, so von Luckner and the Admiralty set out to
find twenty six additional Norwegian speaking German sailors. These sailors were
selected and sent home to keep them from talking to one another about their yet unknown
mission while “letters were fabricated, not just one or two letters, but correspondence
covering the entire time that each man was supposed to have been with the ship. The
forgeries were done by women in the confidential levels in the Admiralty and Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.”26 In addition to the letters, the easily accessible bunk area for the
‘Norwegian’ crew included photographs of ‘loved ones’ stamped to real businesses in
Norway, books, paintings, foods, logos, navigational instruments, and even shirt tags, all
made to look worn and beaten by years of traveling at sea.27 The rest of the crew, as well
as the potential four hundred prisoners, were to be housed behind a secret compartment in
von Luckner’s private rooms in the ship, so that in case of a search by the British they
could remain hidden, and scuttle the ship if the ruse failed.28
When all the preparations were finished, the new Maletta registered its true name
with the German Navy as the commerce raider SMS Seeadler (Sea Eagle) before being
brought out of the harbor, loaded with fake Norwegian timber, and the entire crew
brought aboard and informed about their mission. However, the German government sent
a message for them to wait until the U-Boat Deutschland returned with an important
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shipment from the United States, delaying the Seeadler’s departure for three weeks, at
which point the true Maletta had already departed Copenhagen and gone through the
British blockade.29 Attempting to find another, similarly structured ship, von Luckner
rewrote other names until the logbook was damaged by the erasing. This would have
been a dead giveaway to the British, so he ordered the ship’s carpenter to break and
repair her as if she had gone through a nasty storm, and for all the men to drench
everything in sea water.30 Renamed the Hero—an entirely fictitious ship that would
hopefully get through either unnoticed or without raising too much suspicion by not
being in the British logs—the men of the Seeadler set out for Skagerrak and the
Atlantic.31
They left on 21st December 1916, and the first hurdle was to evade the British
minefield set to a depth of around twenty five feet below sea level to destroy men-of-war,
not Scottish built sailing ships with a—still too close for comfort—draft of eighteen
feet.32 After shifting the weight of the lifeboats and materials on deck, the Seeadler glid
across the minefield without any issues, and under cover of a North Sea storm was able to
pass through the first two of the three British blockade rings without being noticed. While
moving north toward Iceland to evade the British around the Orkneys, the sails of the
ship froze and the winds forced her to continue moving north-west towards the Arctic
Ocean, where they could easily be trapped in pack ice until long after the war ended.33
The situation deteriorated further as the “men in the hold, my fighting crew, huddled
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together to keep from freezing. They were prisoners, for the waves and spray had swept
over everything until our secret hatches were frozen as solid as concrete. My false
Norsemen on deck slid about on the icy planks, and every man suffered from frostbite.”34
Finally, on Christmas Eve a northern wind blew, and the Seeadler turned south-west,
where they met by the HMS Patia on Christmas Day.
This was the moment that the Norwegian disguise was made for, so the twenty
seven Norse speakers prepared for the show while the rest waited below deck for either
the ‘all-clear’ or ‘scuttle’ signal to be given. Lieutenant Holland of the Patia was sent to
inspect the ship’s papers, despite it being a holiday and the ship’s large Norwegian flags
painted on the side, as was common for neutral nations to do, and he saw the damage
form the Hero’s recent encounter with the storm.35 Everything had seemingly been
thought of by von Luckner, who had hung wet laundry, started chewing tobacco like a
true Norse seaman, and masked the scent of the diesel engines—used to move westward
while the sails thawed—by jamming a rag in the exhaust pipe for their kerosene lamp.36
The only question he had not been prepared to answer while Holland inspected the
logbook was what they had done for three weeks after ‘Copenhagen.’
Choking on his own tobacco at the question, von Luckner’s officer Leudemann
quickly spoke up and answered that they had been told to be wary of a German
commerce raider that was supposed to be running the blockade along with several UBoats.37 Stating his approval, Holland gave von Luckner a certificate of authenticity,
stating that the ship was cleared by the British Navy, since he had not found the two 4.1
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inch guns or inspected the crew’s backstories.38 However, Holland told von Luckner to
wait one hour for their signal to depart, leading to a crew member stating that ‘all was
lost’, which was overheard by the fighting crew below decks. After working to keep the
British form seeing the Seeadler’s engine shaft propellers as they left, von Luckner
returned to tell the men below that all was well, only to discover that “not only had the
seacocks been opened… [but the] charges had been set to go off in eight minutes… It
was half an hour before order was restored and the men below were set to work pumping
out the hundreds of gallons of water let in to scuttle the ship.”39 While this was underway,
the Patia signaled London via wireless for a confirmation on the fictitious ship Hero.
Luck was not in short supply, as the wireless station in London was closed for
Christmas and all calls were being forwarded to Liverpool, where a confused employee
signaled back that the Hero was not an issue and could be let through. This error was not
caught by the British Admiralty for four days because the wireless operators in
Copenhagen only reopened after an extended holiday break.40 Sending the international
signal “T-X-B” for “Continue voyage”, the Patia departed, while the men of the
Seeadler, German and ‘Norwegian’ alike celebrated Christmas and their success in
running the blockade with gifts of cigars, brandy, and other goods provided by Mrs.
Bertha Krupp.41
The Seeadler continued north-west to 43°W, 60°N on New Year’s Day, when
they turned towards the Azores and repainted the sides of the ship while abandoning their
false lumber supply, which later convinced the British Admiralty that they were bound

38

Geoffrey Bennet, Naval Battles of the First World War (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1968), 120.
Hoyt, Sea Eagle, 88-90.
40
Ibid., 90-1.
41
Thomas, Count Luckner, 144-5; Jefferson, The Sea Devil, 53-4.
39

68
for German East Africa to aid Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck.42 It was in the vicinity of the
Azores on 9th January 1917 that they encountered their first prize, the British Gladys
Royle carrying Cardiff coal to Argentina. When the Seeadler signaled for a proper time
check while running the Norwegian flag, they used the engines to get within firing range
before the men raised the German war flag, bared their weapons, and fired a shot across
the Gladys Royle’s bow to show that she was to stop. However, the Gladys Royle
continued towards the Seeadler to give it the proper time check it had asked for while
raising her British flag, and only hove to after several additional volleys were fired. The
British Captain Shewan then took a boat over to the Germans to establish what was going
on, as both parties were thoroughly confused.43
An older Captain who remembered the days when sailing ships did most of the
shipping, Shewan saw the firing of a shot across another ship’s bow as the old signal for a
proper chronometer check. Beyond that, the Captain had simply not expected the
Germans to have a three masted windjammer acting as a commerce raider in the Atlantic,
although he was somewhat happy to see a sailing ship raiding during the First World
War, as they had for countless wars before then.44 After scuttling the Gladys Royle and its
coal, which would have been incredibly useful to earlier German raiders in the Atlantic
but had no value for a sailing ship with diesel engines, his crew weas taken to their new
quarters in the Seeadler, and Shewan to the soon to be Captain’s Club room as von
Luckner collected more ships along the way.45
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The British Admiralty was aware that a ship called the Seeadler was supposed to
have broken through their blockade, but they had not put together that it was the
Norwegian Hero, since it would seem unlikely that the two were one and the same.
Therefore, the Seeadler was able to benefit from the ignorance of Allied shipping in the
Atlantic until her prisoner capacity filled, at which point von Luckner would be forced to
release the prisoners—who would then tell the world about the Seeadler.46 This meant
that the prisoners could not know where the vulnerable parts of the ship were, and that
they were to be treated very well to earn Germany a positive image abroad. It also meant
that it was imperative they avoid stopping a neutral ship that would have to be
immediately released under the rules of war, then revealing the truth of the Seeadler.
They had attacked the Gladys Royle despite its lack of colors because of its distinctive
British structure, and they ignored the second Allied ship they saw because it was a large
passenger liner that would have filled their prisoner compartments too quickly.47
The next step was to move south, either with the intention of crossing the Cape of
Good Hope for the Indian Ocean or Cape Horn for the Pacific, but not before a brief stay
along the shipping routes at the equator to hunt for unsuspecting Allied ships. It was there
that they encountered the Horngarth, whose Captain Barton tried to run until his funnel
was shot through, causing the only death from the Seeadler’s raiding—a sixteen year old
boy who was laid to rest at sea when the Seeadler’s doctor Pietsch could not save him.48
It was also Pietsch who discovered why Captain Barton had tried to run after he saw that
the windjammer was German. Pietsch had met him while on the Mӧwe’s first raid, when
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Barton and the other captured Captains all agreed to be released on parole, meaning they
“had signed written promises that they would engage in no further war activity. Believing
he had broken his parole, he thought the Germans would hang him from the yardarm…
‘Only direct combatant service was included under the heading of war activity.
Therefore, we feel ourselves under no unhappy necessity of hanging [him].’”49 The
reputation of the Germans had been severely damaged by the start of 1917 from a
combination of Allied propaganda, brutal actions by Hindenburg on the Western Front,
and the renewed unrestricted submarine warfare. Any chance the Seeadler had of helping
Germany’s image could be accomplished through chivalry and kindness towards their socalled adversaries, although it was often portrayed as the exception to the regular German
activity in the presses.50
The shipping lanes along the Equator were bountiful for an unsuspected
commerce raider, and they captured British, French, and an Italian ship by requesting a
chronometer check or generally moving within range before revealing their true flag and
guns. The Captains’ Club became a hub of activity which von Luckner regularly partook
in, and the single woman—newlywed wife of the Perce’s Captain Kohler—was treated
with the upmost respect from all aboard, who she and the captured Captains interacted
with during their walks on deck as per their parole agreement.51 While not having to
worry about coal like the SMS Emden, Kӧnigsberg, or Karlsruhe before her, the Seeadler
did take supplies of fresh food and water, which was always given to the prisoners of the
ship first, although they were not in short supply while in the Atlantic. When the
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prisoners were eventually released, von Luckner even paid the wages of each captured
sailor for their lost salaries while aboard.52
Only two issues arose during this time, the first of which was that the French
Captains they had captured entirely despised their German adversaries as a result of the
Western Front’s Battle of Marne, First and Second Battle of Ypres—where the Germans
first employed gas weaponry—the Battle of Verdun, and the Battle of the Somme.53 The
Captains of the French La Rochefoucauld, Charles Gounod, and the Antonin were all
initially hostile towards von Luckner, who was pleased that he had prevented materials to
aid the French war effort from arriving in Europe, including enough saltpetre to produce
ammunition that could have killed thousands.54 Two of the Captains grew to accept their
temporary imprisonment and enjoyed the company of the other captured Captains, but
Lecoq of La Rochefoucauld continued to investigate the forward magazines that he had
been barred from walking around.55
On 25th February the Seeadler came across the four masted ship Viking with no
flag, only to discover after catching her, that she was a Danish ship carrying neutral cargo
from Buenos Aires to Copenhagen, meaning that she had to be released under the rules of
war.56 It became necessary for the Seeadler to finally move on from the equator, but not
before stopping the French Cambronne and informing the Captain that it would take over
two hundred prisoners from the Seeadler to Rio de Janeiro. To give themselves additional
time, the “Seeadler’s crew was busy aboard the Cambronne, removing her upper masts
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and yards and jettisoning many of her sails. This was to ensure the French windjammer
made exceptionally slow time on her voyage to Rio.”57 Before the prisoners were
transferred, Lecoq was caught sketching the forward magazines so he could show them to
the authorities upon his arrival at port, putting von Luckner in a difficult and delicate
position.
Count von Luckner took the sketches and allowed Lecoq to leave with the others
before the Seeadler departed for the Pacific Ocean. Although, when they arrived, Lecoq
was the only prisoner who the media picked up as having had a negative experience
aboard the ship.58 When interviewed, one prisoner form the Seeadler—later determined
to be Lecoq—stated that the ship “carries no torpedoes and that her commander’s name is
von Luckner… a bitter anti-American, frequently attacking the United States as an
unscrupulous country whose only aim was the pursuit of wealth.”59 The newspapers did
include the more positive elements of the prisoners’ time aboard, such as how the “sailors
had a band which played frequently and enthusiastically when the men were off duty.
Their orchestra was composed of three mandolins, three violins, a flute and a bass
drum.”60 While the media’s assessments of the Seeadler—which had now finally been
revealed to the public to the disadvantage of her crew—were somewhat mixed, the stories
did well to remind readers of the Emden in the east under Karl von Müller back in 1914.
A pause was taken at the Falklands to commemorate the men of the German East
Asiatic Squadron under Maximillian von Spee, who had been defeated by the British in
1914 and suffered hundreds of casualties. A ten foot Iron Cross was dropped to rest with
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the men.61 Afterwards the Seeadler raced for Cape Horn, the tip of South America and
entrance to the less well-guarded Pacific shipping lanes, before she could be cut off by
the British Navy, which already knew of this from the Viking and assembled near the
coast to catch them. Preparing for this, von Luckner chose to sail the windjammer further
south, far beyond where anyone would expect the sailing ship to be from the coast due to
the danger of icebergs and storms.62
The journey required extra time, and the Seeadler was caught in an Antarctic
hurricane when “suddenly, there came an even more ominous scrapping sound. The
Seeadler quivered, and out blood fairly froze. We had grazed a submerged snout of ice…
No matter who was captain. Everybody to the pumps. I took my place with the sailors in
the hold, and we all fought to keep the water in check.”63 With the pumps going as fast as
they could, and with the combined power of both engines and all the sails put to use
despite the destructive winds, the Seeadler managed to get past the British ships to their
north and come out the other side only slightly the worse for the wear.64
Entering the Pacific in April 1917, von Luckner had the men threw excess life
vests and boats over the edge with the Seeadler’s name on them, while the wireless
operators sent out messages stating that the Seeadler had been sunk to deceive the
British.65 The wireless operators then discovered that the German government had sent
the Zimmerman telegram, proposing that Mexico attack the then-neutral United States in
return for their old territories, which still infuriated von Luckner during his interviews
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with Lowell Thomas in the 1920’s. The wireless operators also overheard that the United
States had entered the war on the side of the Allies on 6th April, further erasing the
number of neutral ports that would be available to the Seeadler, but allowing von
Luckner to seek out American shipping as well.66
Unfortunately, the sheer size of the Pacific Ocean and shipping lanes meant that
the Seeadler’s crew saw very few commerce ships during their four months operating in
the Pacific. They caught three American ships, the RC Slade, Monika, and AB Johnson,
whose stowaway Miss Taylor pretended to be the Captain’s wife while aboard the
Seeadler for fear of German brutality. After she met the men however, she thoroughly
enjoyed her time on the ship, openly speaking with newspapers later about her courteous
and polite captors.67 While that was well, the weeks and months of inactivity meant
unrest for even the most disciplined of crews after half a year at sea, as well as the
thinning of supplies. Tempers ran high, and Captain Smith of the RC Slade claimed that
once, while crewmembers were working “a sailor said: ‘I hope she blows to hell with all
of us on board.’ The count [von Luckner] lying nearby in a hammock overheard. At the
Saturday parade… the captain swore, raved, waved his arms and sentenced him to
fourteen days in the brig.”68 Realizing the need of his men to walk on land and resupply
fresh foods to prevent diseases like scurvy, von Luckner searched for an uninhabited
island to land on, arriving at the French Society Island of Mopelia on 31st July.69
While approaching the island the crew grew increasingly eager to finally stand on
dry land, even if for only a few hours each, and especially after they saw the land that
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was to become their ‘island of the lotus-eaters’ Count von Luckner described the scene
during their final approach, noting how “against the dark blue of the sea and the light
blue of the sky, the sunlight seems to be drawing the green island out of the water, and
the soft south wind carries the scent of flowers far out to sea… Here was a typical coral
atoll—the kind you dream about.”70 The coral may have looked beautiful, but it posed a
legitimate threat to a wooden sailing ship, just as it had for von Mücke’s zambuks along
the shores of the Red Sea. The Seeadler was anchored outside the lagoon while crews
went ashore, discovering three Polynesian fishermen on the island who worked for a
company in Tahiti by collecting turtles and giving them to a ship that came once a year.71
They were happy to have the company, and helped the Germans gather food to bring
back to the Seeadler’s crew and prisoners for a feast, consisting of “turtle soup, broiled
lobster, gull’s egg omellette [sic] roast pork, and fresh coconut.”72
On 2nd August, von Luckner decided to take the majority of the crew to shore for
a picnic, leaving his prize crew leader Leutnant Preis—aptly employed since his name
translates to ‘prize’ in English—and a few others to care for the ship. A ship made in
Scotland was not designed for travel in the shallows of the Pacific, and von Luckner was
keenly aware that “harbours were often intricate and reef strewn, while strong currents
added another dangerous challenge, particularly for a big ship, which was handicapped
by its deeper draft and general unwieldiness on an area where manoeuvrability [sic] was
often vital.”73 Before leaving at nine in the morning, von Luckner consulted the
American Captains about how best to tie up the Seeadler, and they informed him that as
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long as the trade winds did not slacken he could securely connect the ship to the reefs by
way of cables.74
Count von Luckner’s storytelling after the fact led to confusion for historians
about the exact nature of subsequent events, but the general consensus is that the trade
winds slackened on 2nd August while von Luckner and most of the crew was away to
disastrous results. With stronger winds pushing the Seeadler towards the reef it had been
cabled to, the sails could not be unfurled fast enough and the motors’ propellers were
damaged beyond use before Preis could stop the movement, slamming it against the
coral. Seeing the distress signals, von Luckner and his men returned shortly after they had
left and spent the entire day trying to get the ship off of the coral to no success, officially
calling off the effort before dark so they could salvage supplies and bring them to the
island.75 This information was complicated afterwards because von Luckner claimed the
wreck had been caused by a sudden tidal wave, included in Lowell Thomas’ book in
English.76 He corrected himself in his book Ein Freibeuterleben in 1938, but the Second
World War obscured this, and the story was never directly contradicted by crewmembers
publicly, but was found to be false in their diaries and reports seen decades later.77
With the Seeadler wrecked, there was nothing to do except salvage everything
they could—even the wireless, but not the heavy 4.1 inch guns—and create the German
colony of Seeadlerberg. While the crabs, rats, and ants on the island were a nuisance,
each was delt with effectively as proper buildings were made to protect the men from the
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elements, which the Americans were instrumental in producing.78 The former prisoners
and former crewmembers were all aware that the Germans were in charge, but generally
worked together to build their Germantown and Americantown, as well as going fishing,
reading the books that had survived the shipwreck, and spending their newfound leisure
time together.79 Everyone seemed quite content with their vacation in August 1917, while
the Third Battle of Ypres eviscerated French, British, and German soldiers, Tzar Nicholas
II had abdicated in Russia following the rise of the communists, and the Americans
mobilized for the final repulse of the Germans the following year.80 The only one not
thoroughly content with life on the island, away from the bombs, gas attacks, diseases,
and human suffering in Europe, was Count Felix von Luckner.
Having heard the stories of the Emden’s landing crew returning to Germany in the
Ayesha, von Luckner thought that he could emulate the journey. All that was available on
the island were the Seeadler’s lifeboats, so they “devised rigging and sails for our best
lifeboat, mast, jib boom, main boom, gaff stays, and back stays… we loaded her with
provisions for half a dozen men over a long voyage… She was eighteen feet in length and
only about fourteen inches above water amidship.”81 The German Navy’s new ship SMS
Kronprinzessin Cecilie was to travel from Mopelia to the Cook Islands three hundred
miles away, and if unable to find a ship to take there, on to Fiji about one thousand five
hundred miles further. Count von Luckner chose five officers that he could rely on as
they tried to take a ship big enough for the Seeadler’s crew to resume raiding, while
Leutnant Kling would be left in charge of Seeadlerberg with Leutnant Preis, with orders
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to hold out with the three months of supplies before using the other lifeboat to catch their
own ship.82
Neither party would see the other until well after the war ended, although the
island of Mopelia was not the final stand for either. With his five officers aboard, von
Luckner set off for the Cook Islands, arriving at Atiu after three days as a result of
Leutnant Kircheiß’s phenomenal navigational abilities given the circumstances.83 They
explained that they were a Dutch group sailing from America for sport, using
Plattdeutsche to come off less like German officers, which succeeded in tricking the
island’s British resident.84 There was no boat for them to take which would have worked
well, so they set out from the island of Atiu to Aitutaki over a hundred miles away, where
they were questioned by the more skeptical British resident agent Duncan and his
Norwegian friend. Using a Norwegian cover story, they were able to convince the pair
that they were not German, but the local population wanted proof, forcing von Luckner to
threaten Duncan with the weapons on the ship before quickly departing.85 From Aitutaki
they traveled to Rarotanga, but fled when they mistook a broken ship for a battleship at
night, and spent ten days travelling to Fiji, twenty degrees of longitude away.
The journey was brutal and threatened to kill the men, who were now suffering
from severe scurvy after so long at sea without rest or proper supplies. It whitened their
gums, swelled their joints, and loosened their teeth, causing excruciating pain while
trying to eat their reserves of hardtack, and all while their blood turned to water and the
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sea spray coated them in salt.86 They finally arrived at a small British island with an
unoccupied house they used to recover before moving on to Fiji. They left a note
pretending to be British, still held in a New Zealand collection today, and sailed for the
islands, where the locals suspected they were German and secretly reported it to the
authorities via wireless.87 Count von Luckner and his men were physically and mentally
devastated from the scurvy, but managed to find a ship that could work well as the
Seeadler II, hiring the Captain to take them aboard as Norwegian travelers. Their plan to
wait until the ship entered international water and then don their German naval uniforms
to take it properly were dashed when the police arrived, finally ending von Luckner’s
journey after two thousand three hundred miles of travelling in the Kronprinzessin
Cecilie.88
Count von Luckner and Kircheiß were separated from the others due to the
incredibly hostile New Zealanders calling for their blood, as a New Zealand transport
called the Wairuna had gone missing and was blamed on the Seeadler. In truth, the ship
was scuttled by the raider SMS Wolf, but von Luckner had no way of knowing this, and
the people of New Zealand were not interested in the words of a German anyhow as
death notices from Europe continued to pour into their homes.89 While von Luckner
refused to give up the rest of his men on Mopelia, Leutnant Kling attempted his own
version of von Mücke’s journey, taking the French merchant Lutece—renaming it the
Fortuna—and setting out for Chile, using the Seeadler’s radio to signal ships in the area
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to help the Americans on the island.90 He emulated von Mücke well since, like the
Ayesha, the Fortuna’s hull was incredibly rotten. She was just barely able to get the men
to Easter Island, where a rock in the harbor caused her to sink. They were stranded until
25th January 1918, when they were given passage to Chile and interred from 2nd March
1918 until their release on 9th August 1919.91
Count von Luckner joined a group of Germans already interned at the civilian
prison on Motuihe island, which had so little security that the men were allowed to go to
the local shops because Lieutenant-Colonel Turner trusted the Germans’ parole not to
escape.92 However, several of the interned from German Samoa had a plan and
improvised tools—including a functioning sextant made by Walter von Zartorski—that
Kircheiß and von Luckner joined.93 His job was to speak with Turner, who agreed to let
them put on a Christmas play about Jutland, which the men used as a cover to create
sails, ‘fake’ explosives, tools, and preserved food for the journey.94 They escaped using
the only boat on the island after sabotaging the prison’s wireless communications, and
spent several days on the run before being caught resupplying at Cheesman Island by the
steamer Iris. The people of New Zealand, who had hated von Luckner and the Seeadler
up to that point, were so impressed by his actions and the incompetence of their own
military, that he enjoyed folk-legend status for his cunning and bravery, and was even
invited to give talks in 1938, although the rise of fascism in Germany hung over the
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meetings.95 Another escape plan was thought of, but the Armistice came and the men
returned to Germany in June 1919.
With the war finally over, the men of the Seeadler had to adjust to the new
Germany, which had been ravaged by food and fuel shortages, had lost a generation of its
young men, and was saddled with the Treaty of Versailles placing the debt of the victors
on the Weimar Republic’s doorstep. With hyperinflation and military cutbacks, von
Luckner eked out his living by publishing his memoirs and speaking about his life
through the First World War, which were massive hits in Germany, and then in the
United States with the help of Lowell Thomas. He toured the world in his ship Vaterland
during the 1920’s, visiting the United States and meeting prominent political figures,
including an invitation to meet with the president.96
Like many former Imperial German officers, von Luckner subscribed to the belief
that Germany had not really lost the war, calling it a draw and participating in a
demonstration in Halle—that Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck was notably absent from—in
1924, which resulted in a fight with a communist group, and left eleven communists
dead.97 He joined the Freemasons, barring him from the NSDAP, but Hitler and Goebbles
saw the potential to use him as a propaganda tool, and both personally financed another
global trip to spread fascism.98 The secret Gestapo agent aboard von Luckner’s new ship
stated he was shirking his duty to praise German fascism, leading to Hitler’s personal
intervention. Count von Luckner stood trial before the Court of Honor on 5th July 1939,
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but the invasion of Poland soon afterwards ended the proceedings.99 In 1945 he
negotiated the surrender of Halle with the Americans to the agitation of the SS officers
stationed there, and ultimately the people too when they were drawn into the German
Democratic Republic after the war. He moved to Sweden with his wife Ingeborg von
Egestrom, and died in 1966.100
The SMS Seeadler was not the most successful German commerce raider of the
war, the SMS Emden captured over thirty ships and the Mӧwe went on multiple raiding
trips while returning through the British blockade. The Seeadler did not tie down as many
Allied ships as the Kӧnigsberg or sink in battle like the East Asiatic Squadron, but it did
have two major successes that benefit the German war effort. The first of these was the
cargo it sunk, including saltpetre that could have killed thousands, sugar supplies bound
for France, and American trade in the Pacific when they entered the war, altogether over
one hundred thousand tons across sixteen ships, spiking insurance rates for the Allied
nations.101
The other success was improving the image of Germany at a time when the war
had galvanized the people of each side against one another, exacerbated by broken rules
of war, the employment of starvation tactics, and the continued onslaught of artillery and
breakdown of societies.102 Like the Emden, the Seeadler conducted its activities properly
and treated her prisoners well, leading to a well-earned reputation, and serving as the
underdog in neutral newspapers because it was an outfitted windjammer taking on a
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world of cruiser squadrons, minefields, and coal power. The propaganda value was more
than the Imperial German government had expected, and the international interest in von
Luckner’s accounts in German and English during the 1920’s and 1930’s was so strong
that Hitler and Goebbles personally invested in a von Luckner world tour to try and
spread their own messages. While von Luckner’s later aggrandizements complicated the
study of Seeadler, newfound sources and information have allowed historians to paint a
more accurate account of events, which still prove to be an impressive feat of dedication,
discipline, and adventure during the war.
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Chapter IV: The Schutztruppe in the African Theater1

At the end of the First World War, there remained only one German General who
had not suffered a single conventional military defeat at some point, as a result of his
preemptive mobilization for war in early 1914, and whose soldiers laid down their arms
on 25th November 1918.2 This General’s fighting force had eluded the Allies so well that
it became necessary for clause seventeen of the 11th November 1918 Armistice to assert
that the surrender “of all German forces operating in East Africa [would be] within a
period specified by the Allies” in order to give them time to find and inform their
adversary that the war had in fact ended.3 While they had never been formally defeated,
the force had been nearly entirely cut off from all exterior assistance at the start of the
war. Even after their territory fell into British and Belgian hands and the group was
driven out of the colony, they continued to operate as an independent force living off of
given, stolen, and captured supplies, much to the agitation of the English-speaking
world.4 General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck of German East Africa’s Schutztruppe remains
a complex figure in German, Tanzanian, and global history as a result of this conflict in
east Africa.
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A war between the major European powers had long been expected by most on
the continent, and the result was for each to prepare a variety of plans for any
combination of combatant nations. Several of these, such as the French Plan XVII, or the
German Schlieffen Plan, required speed on the European railways to knock out the
enemy’s capitals and end the war before the other had a chance to respond.5 The conflict
in the African colonies, or for that matter any colonies, seems subsidiary in contrast to the
plans that focused on creating a ‘lightning war’ in the European theater. This opinion was
held by the German government, who did not incorporate the colonies into their planning
by 1914 beyond possible naval raiding bases:

The raw-materials argument might have made more sense in [the] context
of a war in which Britain was an unfriendly neutral, but the actual colonies
produced only a few materials… that could be regarded as vital to the
German economy.6

While Berlin may have not needed colonies to conduct their war effort, they had no
intentions of turning them over to the Allied forces without a fight, and even had plans to
expand their imperial holdings when they won the war, creating the continent-spanning
super-colony of Mittelafrika.7
The task of defending the colonies in Africa during the war—which at the start
included Togoland (Togo), the Cameroons (Cameroon), German South West Africa
(Namibia), and German East Africa (Tanzania)—fell to the colonial governments and the
Schutztruppen, the military ‘protection forces’ established to guard German colonies
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from internal and external forces.8 While these colonies did belong to the German
government, the colonists and colonial governments were not always as keen on going to
war without exterior support and entirely surrounded by enemy forces.9 GEA governor
Heinrich Schnee believed that the best course of action, given the German government’s
inability to aid or even communicate with him after the radio station in Windhoek,
GSWA was destroyed, was to pursue neutrality for the good of the colonial population.
Following the orders of the German Colonial Office, Schnee converted all port
cities into ‘open cities’ making them neutral, but effectively in favor of the British Navy,
although supply ships for the German light cruiser and commerce raider SMS Kӧnigsberg
continued to secretly operate in these harbors for the first few months of the war.10 This
was an attractive option for the European population of GEA at the start of the war, and
was done while Schnee appealed to “Walter Page, America’s Ambassador in London, to
broker a restoration of neutrality in all east African colonies in accordance with the 1885
Berlin Act.”11 However, the German colonial citizens’ opinions swung against neutrality
after the British bombarded the capital city of Dar-es-Salaam. This occurred after the
British Navy sailed into the blockaded harbor and sank German ships accused of
containing supplies for the Kӧnigsberg, which was true but unproven at the time of the
scuttle.12
As the population of GEA turned against the British and other Allied forces, they
began to agree with the opinions of Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant Colonel) Paul von
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Lettow-Vorbeck, commander of the Schutztruppe in GEA as assigned by the German
High Command in 1913.13 From the moment he arrived, von Lettow prepared supplies,
the active Schutztruppe, and reserve officers for a war between the European powers as
he realized the geographical location of the colony between British Uganda, the Belgian
Congo, British Rhodesia, Portuguese Mozambique, and the Indian Ocean could be an
issue.14 He did not believe that GEA could conquer the surrounding territories, each with
better equipped and numerically larger militaries, so his initial goal was to hold as much
of GEA as he could for as long as possible, in case the war in Europe really did end
before Christmas 1914.15
Nevertheless, the more important objective for von Lettow was to tie up as much
Allied personnel and war materiel in his theater, since he held that “the fate of the
colonies, as of all German possessions, would only be decided on the battlefields of
Europe.”16 He knew that if the conflict in east Africa progressed, it would force the Allies
to send increasing numbers of soldiers to root out the Schutztruppe. Eventually, von
Lettow and the Schutztruppe would have to continue the war on foreign colonial soil,
with only the supplies that they could scavenge or capture, which became the case in
Portuguese Mozambique in 1917.17
As the Germans debated the role of the colonies in the overall German war effort,
the lengthy east African campaign proceeded on the backs of two other groups. The first
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of these were the colonized populations of Africa. The British were able to use a
collection of non-British colonial populations to fight in east Africa until later in the war,
when mounting losses and fear of a major blow to Allied moral led to the use of more
British troops. These groups included native police forces of their three colonies
bordering GEA, Indian and Boer soldiers, and an international collection of British
colonists forming the Frontiersmen.18 The Germans had to rely much more heavily on
native east African soldiers, called Askari, to supplement their military presence even
before the war, which was what led to the creation of the Schutztruppe in 1889.19
While there have been differing interpretations of what motivated sections of the
native population of GEA to fight so diligently for the Germans—including ideas of
loyalty to the Kaiser or settling personal scores using European weaponry—some
contemporary scholars have tried a new approach. They find that the Askari joined the
Schutztruppe to better their material and social status, and later in their service found the
organization and comradery of military life more enjoyable than regular farm life. By the
First World War, the Askari wanted to maintain the material wealth and lifestyle that they
earned through the ‘small wars’ and Maji Maji Rebellion.20 However, those native
Africans that were not members of the Askari or colonial police forces often found
themselves either pushed, or fully forced into service as porters of war material on both
sides by the end of the conflict.
The choice of the Allies to participate in the east African campaign was not done
out of national zeal, so much as it was the only option left after the Schutztruppe’s attacks
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on the neighboring colonies at the start of the war. While Governor Schnee had agreed to
convert all coastal cities into ‘open ports’ and was courting the American Ambassador to
enforce the Berlin Act, von Lettow had started to replicate the lightning war in Europe
along GEA’s borders. He and his officers began by crossing the border into British East
Africa (BEA) to attack the vital Uganda Railway—a massive undertaking that the British
colony built between 1896 and 1901—to prevent swift mobilization by the British, and to
harm the Empire’s prestige in the eyes of its BEA citizens.21 The Schutztruppe also
attacked the port Lukuga of the then-neutral Belgian Congo on Lake Tanganyika in early
August 1914 to maintain naval supremacy with their warship the Hedwig von Wissmann,
and briefly invaded northern Portuguese Mozambique.22 With the threat to colonists and
prestige, alongside the opportunity for the British to seize another colony after the war,
grand scale intervention became a necessity.23
Even as the motivation to defeat the German colonial forces was high, and the
risk of their resupply from Germany almost nonexistent given British naval supremacy,
the Allied side of the east African campaign was still unable to defeat the Schutztruppe
for the entirety of the war. What should have been a quick and easy campaign—as was
the fall of Togoland within days to the British, or the swift conquest of German Samoa,
New Guinea, and Tsingtau by New Zealand, Australia, and Japan—instead involved
hundreds of thousands of Allied personnel that could have been fighting in Europe.24 An
investigation of the Allied and Schutztruppe forces during the campaign reveals a variety
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of possible answers, including an underestimation of German and Askari capabilities,
Allied possession of advanced technology being hampered by lack of proper use training,
lack of transportation ability, and poor leadership.

A map of German East Africa and the colonies that surrounded it in 1914, as well as the major railways of
east Africa at the time.25
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After Governor Schnee chose to pursue his public policy of neutrality, and von
Lettow promptly invaded Allied territories, the British planned an invasion of the key city
Tanga for early November 1914, located along the shore in north-eastern GEA. The city
was central to the colony’s two major railroads: the first was the Usambara railroad from
Tanga to New Moshi, located near Mount Kilimanjaro at the colony’s border: the second
was the Ungabara railroad from Dar-es-Salaam to the port city of Kigoma on Lake
Tanganyika.26 In charge of the invasion was British Major-General Arthur Aitken, leader
of the Indian Expeditionary Force ‘B’ (IEF ‘B’), which was a collection of less
experienced Indian units sent to east Africa in conditions so appalling that they were
compared to those of the Middle Passage, with barely enough room to lie side by side
below deck for all three weeks of their voyage.27
While there were protests from the medical personnel and commanders—since
the element of surprise was lost after the British followed the rules of war and informed
the ‘open port’ of a coming military operation,—“Aitken decided to proceed immediately
against the port of Tanga… without disembarking his force to recover from their voyage
and reorganize.”28 With the element of surprise already gone, Aitken had nothing to lose
from stopping to let his soldiers acclimate to the land and new environment. His plan to
invade Tanga at once can most likely be attributed to his belief that “‘The Indian Army
will make short work of a lot of n——s,’ he said.”29 An example of the racially-based
thinking that inhabited the minds of many imperialists across Europe at the time, Aitken
paid for his lack of planning or concern. The result of the British invasion of Tanga was
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the complete repulsion of British and Indian troops by the very African Askari that
Aitken had discounted, and ultimately the operation had to be censored throughout the
Empire to keep morale from plummeting.30
This underestimation and belief in the inherent superiority that British Indian
soldiers would have over the German colonial military set off a chain reaction of blunders
throughout the invasion. The first of these was that the Indian forces which landed on the
southern side of Tanga were repelled by the Schutztruppe, and the German commander
on the field could see that the HMS Fox in the harbor “had fired about a dozen shots in
the rubber plantation, killing only retreating Rajputs and Pioneers [both British troops],
but now, two hours later, she began shelling Tanga itself.”31 Many of the Rajputs had
never seen action before, but even the most experienced soldiers would be confused if
they were fired upon for hours by both the enemy and their own naval support.
The Schutztruppe, recognizing that they could fully repel the invading forces,
proceeded to return them to the beach at which they had disembarked. Realizing that the
invasion had failed, it was decided that the British would immediately abandon nearly
fifty wounded men, as well as “sixteen machine guns, hundreds of rifles, six hundred
thousand rounds of ammunition, food and other stores, and coats and blankets enough to
last them for the rest of the war.”32 Altogether, the British had done worse than to simply
underestimate their enemy and fail to coordinate between their naval and invading forces,
but rather had created an event that spread by word of mouth throughout the Empire,
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boosting German and GEA morale, and resupplying an enemy that was otherwise cutoff
from external aid.
The lack of advanced military equipment held by the Schutztruppe, and low
chance of resupply from the Krupp and Howitzer factories in Germany, made both the
hit-and-run tactics and capture of enemy arms far more critical. When the war broke out
in June 1914, “all askari [had] learned to shoot the Mauser M/71, a single-shot .450caliber rifle that used black-powder cartridges famous for giving off clouds of black
smoke and betraying soldiers’ locations. Askari regularly undertook strictly monitored
target practice, with sharpshooters receiving special recognition and insignia.”33
Realizing that the Schutztruppe would be severely outnumbered by enemy forces should
a war break out, it became necessary to both train the Askari to be self-sufficient with the
materials they had, and to instill in them a sense of superiority over the militaries of the
neighboring colonies.34 As such, when the war began the Askari were fully able to
sharpshoot and then relocate to avoid detection—proven to the Germans and British at
Tanga—and the best of which were awarded captured modern rifles as a more practical
decoration for their service.35
The Allied advantage of advanced machinery included hand grenades, mortars,
and vehicles for transportation, although the last of these were in short supply due to the
need in Europe. Additionally, motor vehicles were often not used due to the condition of
the roads, especially during the abnormally aggressive rainy season of 1917.36 The tools
of war, however, were proven effective after a fairly routine Schutztruppe attack on a
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King’s African Rifles battalion at Kibata in 1916, when “the British brought… the Mills
bomb, or hand grenade, which had made its appearance earlier on the Western Front, but
had never been seen in Africa… when [the Askari] rose to attack with bayonet, they were
mowed down by the grenadiers. They lost forty officers and men in that engagement.”37
While the element of surprise had been on the Allied sides for their first use of the
grenade in Africa, the future success of modern weapons relied on proper training with
the materials.
However, it was the proper training—or more accurately lack thereof—that was
often the problem for utilizing new technology against the Schutztruppe, as was the case
with the Allied mortar teams. When a frontal assault was conducted to push the
Schutztruppe into a pincer movement, “the mortar crews were new and they did not quite
understand their weapons. In this particular case they made the mistake of
underestimating the range, so when the Gold Coast Regiment blacks attacked frontally,
they were hit by the German machine guns and plastered by their own mortars.”38 While
the British were supplying their troops in east Africa with effective equipment, the failure
of the leadership and training at the campaign level made them worse than ineffectual.
Later, the Schutztruppe began to adapt to grenade and mortar warfare, eventually
capturing several the pieces and training units in their operation for their own mortar
teams against the Allies.39
The tactics of both sides was another underlying issue, and specifically it was the
ability to adapt tactics that made the Schutztruppe so elusive over the course of the war,
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and the Allies so predictable. While the Allied forces in Africa had defeated the
Shutztruppen of Togoland, German South West Africa, and the Cameroons by the end of
1916, it was noted early on that the GEA campaign “was the first time in history that a
British Army had in a tropical wilderness encountered an enemy force officered by
highly-trained Europeans. The combination meant that every advantage of terrain and
climate would be used against us.”40 Commander-in-Chief of British and South African
forces in 1916, Jan Smuts continuously attempted the same tactic of flanking the
Schutztruppe while keeping them busy through a head-on attack, albeit with the
occasional fourth column for extra security.41 These attempts in an area where he, and at
times even the Germans, had no accurate maps—due to historically uncooperative native
groups, lack of infrastructure, and since the GEA was approximately the size of Germany
and France combined—always ended in failure.42
On one of the only occasions upon which Smuts’ encirclement of German
commander Ernst Otto was completed, “Otto saw what had happened and gave the order:
the Askaris were to scatter and make their way to the prearranged rendezvous, the banks
of the Rufiji. The British came on… but the real Askaris got away once more… They all
crossed, and Capitan Otto blew up the bridge behind them.”43 The guerilla tactics of the
Schutztruppe, who were also on their own turf for the majority of the campaign, were
continuously effective against the European style of warfare that was not designed for
massive, scarcely developed jungles in Africa. With only rare exceptions, the hit-and-run
style and simple goal of keeping the Allies a step behind, rather than trying to defeat
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Allied forces in grand battles, were perfect for the Schutztruppe, and only when the
British began switched to a war of attrition in 1917 by raiding grain supplies in southern
GEA did von Lettow realize he had to leave the colony or face defeat.44
Arguably more critical than any amount of tactical genius, modern weapons, or
even quinine to prevent the infection of malaria in the European populations, were the
porters who had to move everything through the jungles.45 As the British pushed further
into GEA, away from the few railways and into territory that even the Germans had
rarely travelled through prior, their motor vehicles were increasingly ineffective in the
mountains and jungles.46 In order to transport heavy artillery, lodgings, food, medical
supplies, and the personal effects of European, Indian, and African troops alike, the
Allies continuously set up incentive programs and conscription schemes to keep their
supply lines functional. However, as German snipers attacked supply lines, exhaustion
and hunger set in, and the tse-tse fly and tropical diseases continued to kill and
incapacitate thousands of porters every week, Smuts had to request the British
government transport or conscript fifteen thousand new porters each month to stay at the
same numbers.47
The Belgian Congo was one of the most aggressive forces in Africa when it came
to forcing native populations to act as its much-needed porters. The German and Belgian
colonies had worked together to end the slave trade in east Africa during the turn of the
nineteenth century, although King Leopold II’s treatment of the people of the Congo was
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so brutal that the Belgian state took control of ‘his personal’ colony in 1908.48 When the
war broke out and Belgium’s government in absentia ordered the Congo to aid Allied
forces in Africa, the Congo’s fifteen thousand strong paramilitary police Force Publique
was mobilized to protect British Rhodesia against the Schutztruppe’s early actions
there.49 The Belgian Congo was less prepared for the war than either GEA or the British:

The high demand for porters put much strain on the weak colonial state
and threatened to disturb its fragile relationship with local societies… [the]
Belgians hoped to replace the deserted, dead, or unfit porters with men
recruited in the occupied territories… Whole villages, including women
and children, were forced to serve as porters for the troops.50

Between the British and Belgians in east Africa, the majority of the porters had worked
for the British, although the porters conscripted by the Belgians consistently had the
numerically highest mortality.
The German colonial government knew that war in east Africa would likely mean
the fall of the industrialized coastal cities, and thus control of the railroads would belong
to the Allies. Severely limited heavy artillery would look—to most European
commanders of the time—like a massive disadvantage, if not a deciding factor in battle.
However, von Lettow understood that the minimal artillery he had—two 1873 artillery
pieces and the guns taken from the Kӧnigsberg after it was trapped in the Rufiji River
Delta by the British—would mean transportation could be faster and through the jungle.51
Porters would still be necessary, and it was hard for the Schutztruppe when many
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deserted in 1918 during a brief return to GEA following months of guerilla war in foreign
Mozambique, living off supplies given by sympathetic villages, or pillaged from native
and imperialists alike. But the Schutztruppe never needed nearly as many porters as the
heavily-equipped British and Belgian troops pursuing them.52 At the end of the war, the
Allied forces had used between them six hundred thousand to one million porters, either
through employment, conscription, or slavery, while the Germans had—although through
not dissimilar means—only had forty-five thousand porters work for them.53
It had been expected by the Allies that the Schutztruppe would finally be pushed
into a winner-take-all fight at the GEA-Mozambique border by the end of 1917, given
that the rest of the colony lay in Allied hands. However, von Lettow’s decision to
abandon GEA and cross into Portuguese Mozambique—Portugal having entered the war
in early 1916—to continue causing trouble for the Allies showed what had always been
more important for the General.54 The Portuguese military was undisciplined and easily
defeated by the battle-hardened Schutztruppe, and the Portuguese were so ruthless against
their native populations that villages often gave supplies to the Germans out of spite.55
The rest of the war was just as it had been at the start, with the Allies chasing ghosts in
the jungle, who at that point used exclusively modern rifles that had all been captured
from the Allied supply stations and defeated units.56 Despite GEA having fallen entirely
into the hands of the Allies, the Schutztruppe and von Lettow refused to give up—just as
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von Mücke and the men of the Ayesha had during their trek to Berlin—and the Allies
could not stop as long as towns and supplies continued to be raided and destroyed, so the
war went on into 1918.
While the Schutztruppe was well-supplied by easily-defeated Portuguese troops
during 1917 and 1918—with anti-malarial drugs estimated to last until mid-1919—the
German officers, Askari, and porters continued to dwindle as desertion, Allied attacks,
and disease stalked the them.57 The Schutztruppe had gone from about 3,000 Europeans
and 11,000 Askari in 1914 to “155 Europeans, comprising 30 officers, medical officers
and higher officials, 1,168 Askari, and about 3,000 other natives” by November 1918.58
With the colony abandoned, and a major conflict or pincer movement threatening the
shrinking Schutztruppe, plans were devised to move through GEA to Rhodesia, and
perhaps afterwards through the Congo to fight on the western coast and keep the Allies
pinned in the African theater.59
That is, until a message was brought to von Lettow from a captured British
messenger on 12th November 1918, from which “he learnt of the Armistice in Europe…
news conveyed by the British officers [confirmed] the state of turmoil in Germany, the
mutiny of the German fleet, the Kaiser’s abdication, and Ludendorff’s flight to
Sweden.”60 The results of the conflict in Europe were still to be fully established, but the
revolution, Armistice, and demand that the Schutztruppe surrender unconditionally at
Abercorn, Rhodesia on 25th November 1918 in accordance with the seventeenth clause of
the Armistice took the last members of the Imperial German military out of the world
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war.61 There were those members among the Schutztruppe’s officers that wanted, even
after the surrender, to take up arms again and proceed across the continent—as the
unconditional surrender of an undefeated enemy seemed wrong to them—and while von
Lettow appreciated their vigor, he knew the war had ended.
After the war, von Lettow spoke with his English adversaries and estimated that
“137 [Allied] Generals had been in the field, and in all about 300,000 men had been
employed against us. The enemy’s losses in dead would not be put too high at 60,000.”62
The Schutztruppe was detained in Africa for several months as the cost of the Allied
campaign was calculated in dollar amounts for future use, the Askari were repatriated to
GEA, and the Germans colonists were rounded up to be sent to Germany. They returned
to Berlin on 2nd March 1919 and were received by cheering crowds turned out to see the
undefeated Schutztruppe.63
The reception of the campaign in Europe was another matter, and was ultimately
delayed by the British cutting communications to Africa and censoring the failure at
Tanga as early as November 1914. It was only at the tail end of December 1914 that
something appeared in the news, although in a South African paper rather than a British
or east African paper, because “Prime Minister Asquith did not inform King George V
until 11th November, three days after the shattered remains of IEF ‘B’ landed at
Mombasa, by which time his government had decided that such a ‘grave set-back’ was
best covered up.”64 While the Germans were able to receive colonial news via the thenoperational radio transmitters in GEA and GSWA—and cheered on von Lettow and the
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Schutztruppe—the British government set about censoring Tanga across their Empire,
and at the highest levels as well. British East Africa and Mombasa became aware by
word of mouth, and immediately the British citizen’s clubs of each colony began to sing
songs about the failure of their own men in Tanga, highlighting why the British
government chose to keep this information from their domestic population.65
As the war ground to a stalemate on the Western Front, the population of Britain
became increasingly interested in east Africa, as by mid-1916 all other German colonies
in Africa and east Asia had fallen to Allied forces, whether British, South African,
Australian, Japanese or otherwise.66 Unlike some of the accounts of enemy leaders that
appeared in British newspapers in the early days of the war, such as von Müller or von
Mücke, by late-1916 the war in Africa had cost so much in Allied time, resources, and
lives that the depictions of von Lettow and the Schutztruppe were negative, not unlike
some of the depictions of Count Felix von Luckner’s SMS Seeadler in 1917. The
Schutztruppe was portrayed as a lawless group of African soldiers, with either
disinterested or actively maniacal German officers, and newspapers referenced
“photographs showing the cruelty inflicted on the harmless village people, male and
female… Resentment is general throughout the Empire against German excesses, which
presume quite rightly that England will never condescend to answer in kind.”67 It was
entirely true that by the end of 1916 and 1917, the Germans had begun to forcibly
conscript members of the native population in GEA as porters, although the Belgian
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Congo was doing quite the same, and the British were similarly doing so from the
colonies in Asia and across Africa to be sent to GEA.
By the end of the war in 1918, when the Eastern Front had collapsed to German
control and the Americans had joined the Allies, there was little doubt that the public of
the Allied nations were condemning the Germans in Africa, and their governments were
planning to take the colonies after the war. The English speaking colonists in Hong Kong
read that von Lettow was “no more than an outlaw and his escapades cannot have the
slightest effect on the Allied occupation of German East Africa, where the natives after
the brutal treatment meted out to them by their former taskmasters, have taken most
kindly to the beneficent presence of the Allied army of occupation.”68 Published on 10th
September 1918, the full horrors of the war had become fully apparent, and unlike the
days of the SMS Emden’s commerce raiding in compliance with the rules of war, or the
international interest in the crew of the Ayesha’s journey, the public of both sides had
turned fully against the other. On the same day that this was published in south-east Asia,
another article was being published in New York City—by that point America was an
Allied nation—which held that “knowing that [German] occupation of African ports and
command of sea routes would be a permanent danger to peace, is the restoration to
Germany of her colonies, let alone any extension of them, likely to commend itself to a
free world?”69 Germany no longer held the colonial territories it had at the start of the
First World War, yet the newspapers and leaders of the Allied countries claimed in late
1918 that returning any land abroad to Germany would be a severe mistake.70
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These perceptions of the colonial competition’s importance in the First World
War have evolved over time, becoming even comedic by the end of the twentieth century
in Britain given the reality of the situation. The British comedy Television program
Blackadder, whose final season aired in 1989 and was set in the trenches of the Great
War, explained why this colonial thinking during the war was flawed, stating that “the
British Empire at present covers a quarter of the globe, while the German Empire consists
of a small sausage factory in Tanganyika. I hardly think that we can be absolved from
blame on the imperialistic front.”71 Just as the Allies overemphasized the importance of
Germany’s colonialism, so did Berlin to itself by the end of the war, as they had grand
schemes to win the war and create a massive German colony containing most of subSaharan Africa, despite the little importance Germany’s colonies played before the
conflict.72 When the war ended and the Treaty of Versailles was signed, each colony was
put under another nation’s authority, and the German populations sent back to Europe,
with the key exception of GSWA—modern Namibia—where the colonists were allowed
to stay.73
Germany was another matter entirely, with Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck seen as a
national hero, being the only General during the war to evade a conventional defeat in the
entire German Army. He and the German members of the Schutztruppe did not return to
their homes until 1919, and when they did it was under new leadership as the revolution
in 1918 had deposed the Kaiser and led to the signing of the Armistice.74 Not every
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German citizen was happy to have him back, and “after the parade through the
Brandenburg Gate, Berlin’s mayor had planned a formal banquet to celebrate von
Lettow’s campaigns in Africa. This he cancelled, fearing violent interruptions from gangs
of anti-Imperialist, pro-Bolshevik revolutionaries.”75 Nevertheless, much like the men of
the Ayesha and Seeadler, the stories of the Schutztruppe’s determination to continuously
operate in Africa and keep as many Allied troops out of Europe as possible had intrigued
and brought hope to many Germans during the war.
The hope and inspiration that the Schutztruppe and von Lettow brought to
Germany came in the form of an army undefeated in battle, and was used by groups in
Germany going forward to describe the problems with the end of the war and Treaty of
Versailles. The German colonies were divided amongst the victors, but while they had
been of little importance before the war, the grand schemes for Mittelafrika and
Mitteleuropa in 1918 had convinced many that colonies were a necessity for a modern
nation. With the colonies taken away from Germany, no longer did the theory that
enlightened nations had to bring civilization to the rest of the world work in Germany’s
favor, rather it meant that Germany was no longer one of the civilized nations since they
had no colonies.76
Using the outrage to their advantage, Hitler and the NSDAP gained the support of
the conservative Colonial Society by including the return of the African colonies as a
foreign-policy objective, however “in actual policymaking… Hitler largely ignored the
Colonial Society… In 1938, when offered the African colonies in return for passing up
Czechoslovakia, Hitler had no reluctance in choosing continental expansion over
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colonial.”77 The organization was mostly filled with former colonial officials when it was
brought into the government in the mid-1930’s, including former GEA Governor
Heinrich Schnee. Schnee became an ardent supporter of Hitler’s public policies on the
African colonies, and was eventually elevated to the position of ‘administrator of
colonies’, which would have made him leader of all Third Reich colonies had the Second
World War gone in his favor.78
As for the former Schutztruppe commander Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, the postwar era saw a variety of plans fall through, including a brief military career with the
Weimar Republic, involvement in the Kapp Putsch, and an unsuccessful try at politics.79
Still the only German General of the First World War to hold the dual honors of the Pour
le Mérite award from the Kaiser and an undefeated record in battle, he was approached
by the NSDAP to join, as the Schutztruppe was already used for propaganda purposes by
the new government.80 He unquestionably declined a position in the new government or
party and instead decided to live in retirement, although he lost both of his sons during
the Second World War.81
The legacy of the Schutztruppe in the former colony of German East Africa, later
Tanganyika, and today Tanzania, was similarly complex. Many of the living Askari who
had served in the Schutztruppe travelled to Dar-es-Salaam in 1953 when they heard word
that the eighty three year old commander was returning for a visit, and he enjoyed
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speaking with them and reminiscing on their shared history.82 However, the former
Askari were largely forgotten immediately after the war—with the exception of von
Lettow fighting to have their backpay upheld by new German governments—and did not
reenter the Tanganyikan zeitgeist until the period of African nationalism in the 1950’s
and 1960’s. At that point, they were seen as the former servants of the imperialists who
had subjugated east Africa and were ostracized for it. Some modern scholars hold that
they had only been living life in a fashion similar to how they had before German
occupation, but with the ability to gain modern luxuries and increase their societal
standings.83
The odyssey of the Schutztruppe through the jungles of German East Africa, and
later Mozambique as well, was only possible because of the conjunction of multiple
factors on both sides. Cut off from material aid, and later fully isolated from contact with
Berlin, the militarily weaker German colony lacked the modern weaponry and supplies of
its Allied neighbors. While this meant that the Schutztruppe could not successfully defeat
their enemies, they could slip through their enemy’s fingers and avoid a decisive defeat
instead. European style warfare did not suit the terrain and simple transportation methods
of GEA, so blending Askari sharpshooting skill, knowledge of the area, and selfpreservation with von Lettow’s campaign goals meant guerilla hit-and-run tactics were
ideal. The British and Belgian forces could have approached the issues similarly, yet only
after Major-General Arthur Aitken’s underestimation of the enemy at Tanga in 1914, and
Commander-in-Chief Jan Smuts’ steadfast use of the ineffective pincer movement until
1917, did a war of attrition that really threatened the Schutztruppe finally begin.
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When the Schutztruppe left GEA in 1917, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck was entirely
in charge, with Governor Schnee now outside of what had been his administration of
GEA, and Captain Looff of the sunken Kӧnigsberg being left in the colony with the sick
and wounded for the British to take to avoid any power dispute.84 Through raids on local
villages and towns, defeating enemies, and always moving ahead of the British’ slow and
overstretched supply lines, the Schutztruppe operated entirely independently for the better
part of a year.85 They brought hope to the people of Germany, were a thorn in the side of
the Allied governments, and succeeded in carrying out von Lettow’s goals. Their story
became a myth used by later German leaders to claim that Germany had fought
honorably during the First World War, and was used by the NSDAP as propaganda,
despite von Lettow’s refusal to ever join or support the NSDAP.
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Conclusion

A war between the European superpowers at the start of the twentieth century was
something that each nation prepared for, and that some suspected would happen again as
it had in the seventeenth century (the Thirty Years War), eighteenth century (the Seven
Years War), and nineteenth century (the Napoleonic wars). The creation of war plans by
each European nation which relied on immediate mobilization of a trained-military,
pinpoint accurate railroad timetables, and a collection of possible allies dependent on the
adversary meant that a spark could easily set off a series of events that diplomacy may be
unable to stop. Such was the case in the summer of 1914, when the Serbian-Russian
alliance was activated to combat the Austro-Hungarian Empire after crown prince
Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated by Serbian nationalists.
To combat Russia, Austria-Hungary requested the German Empire stand with
them as per the Triple Alliance with Italy, who would remain neutral if a war between
Russia and the other two occurred. France and Russia had agreed to help the other if
attacked by Germany, and a French-British-Russian agreement was reached where if any
two were attacked, the other would intervene as well. On top of these alliances,
economic, military, and colonial factors made a war more appealing to each nation, with
the possibilities of gaining new colonies abroad, securing the status as global naval
superpower, and gaining valuable territories in Europe within reach of either side. For
many Europeans in the colonies abroad, regardless of what language they spoke, the
problems on the continent during July 1914 seemed inconsequential, and so colonists
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continued to intermingle with other Europeans over coffee, tea, and beers until the
closing days of the month.
By 11th November 1918, the German Navy and people had revolted against the
Kaiser and forced his resignation after he fled to Holland, the Russian Empire had fallen,
millions of French and British soldiers—domestic and colonial subjects alike—had
perished, Japan and the United States had entered the war, and Austria-Hungary, the
Ottoman Empire, and Italy were on the verge of collapse or revolution. Over the period
of August 1914 to November 1918, the perceptions of what a war between the ‘civilized’
European superpowers had been dismantled, with the ideas of a quick war composed of
secret alliances and lightning-quick timetables looking more than just naïve. Examples of
the chivalrous warfare that many had expected the war to look like in 1914 occurred
throughout the conflict abroad from Europe, which received attention in the global press
because of how they contrasted with the European theater’s barbarism. However, as the
war dragged on, the growing hostility and global polarization was reflected in the media
of the nations directly involved in the conflict, and even in the press of neutral nations,
revealing the global corrosion of both international comradery and expectations of
modern war.
Stationed at the German colony Kaiutschou in China, the SMS Emden was put on
high alert by German East Asia Squadron leader Maximillian von Spee as the European
situation escalated in July 1914. While ships of the Britain and Germany navies
continued to meet for formal gatherings and fun competitions during this time, and the
Europeans of the colony were all too happy to continue living in bliss as they had for
years before, preparations were made for the Squadron since a war with Russia, France,
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Japan, and especially the British would leave the colony entirely isolated. The days of
inter-military comradeship during the siege of Peking in 1900 were coming to a close,
and it became necessary for the Squadron to leave the colony to its fate as declarations of
war appeared in August 1914.
Fregattenkapitän Karl von Müller of the Emden was able to convince the
Squadron that his ship should be left to raid commerce in the Indian Ocean while the
others moved across the Pacific towards the Americas, keeping the Allied navies busy
abroad and damaging the confidence of the Allied colonies that their imperial masters
could protect them. The Emden’s career was very successful, capturing around thirty
Allied ships from August to November 1914, damaging the oil tanks at Madras, India,
utterly destroying Russian and French naval ships at Penang, and putting up a respectable
fight at Direction Island against the HMAS Sydney. The papers in Germany, neutral
nations such as America and Norway, and even the Allied colonies praised the Emden’s
crew and leadership at the time for their cunning, bravery, and achievement at commerce
raiding in accordance with the rules of war. While the invasion of neutral Belgium in
Europe harmed international opinion of Germany, the actions of von Müller succeeded in
garnering praise from even Germany’s enemies for their proper conduct towards
prisoners and respectful compliance after being defeated, although the German General
Staff cared little.
While the Emden had been defeated while trying to destroy the British radio
station on Direction Island, the landing crew that had not returned to the ship chose to
leave in a captured three-masted schooner named the Ayesha, much to the amusement of
the local British, who provided resources, luxuries, and weather information to the
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Germans for their journey. Pretending to be an incompetent fishing vessel while in
international waters, the men of the Ayesha under Hellmuth von Mücke reached the
Dutch port of Pedang, where they raised their imperial colors and followed all the rules of
a legitimate warship so they would be treated accordingly. After receiving a plan to meet
the German ship Choising elsewhere, the Ayesha departed Pedang to avoid being trapped,
and completed over one thousand seven hundred nautical miles before being scuttled in
December once it reached the appointed meeting zone.
With German East Africa and the SMS Kӧnigsberg reportedly blocked off by the
British Navy along east Africa, von Mücke chose to disguise the Choising as a neutral
Italian ship and make for the Yemen region of the Ottoman Empire, which according to
captured newspapers appeared to be at war with the British. They landed near Hodeida
with the intention of taking the supposedly completed Hejaz railroad to Constantinople
and then safely travel to Berlin, but discovered that the railway had never been
completed, the British and French navies were patrolling the Red Sea, and their Turkish
allies were a hindrance. Adapting to their surroundings, the landing crew of the Emden—
which still had its four machine guns and a collection of German rifles and pistols from
the raid on Direction Island—learned to ride camels, secretly barter with locals, and sail
local zambuks slowly up the shores of the Red Sea to avoid detection.
By May 1915, nearly half of a year after the Emden had been defeated, the men
had their final fight against a group of several hundred Bedouin raiders, managing to
maintain a defensive perimeter and hold out until help arrived from a nearby Turkish city.
While later than expected, the reception at the Hejaz railroad in Al Ula, and then at
Damascus and Constantinople, resulted in international attention and admiration for an

112
odyssey well accomplished, with German and American newspaper articles hanging on
every detail, and the French consul in Constantinople attending the reception in their
honor as well. However, the war had gone on for nine months by that point, and British
papers spoke little about their arrival, even explaining to readers just before it was
completed that the German people had been fooled by their government and would soon
have their hopes crushed.
The year and a half of war that followed the landing crew’s famous
accomplishment saw the increased use of brutal weapons and tactics by both sides,
including gas attacks, the British blockade in the North Sea starting to starve the German
people, and the resumption of unrestricted German U-Boat warfare that threatened to
starve the British Isle in turn. When the inconclusive Battle of Jutland (or Skagerrak)
resulted in both sides claiming victory at home, but neither having achieved their goals,
the German Admiralty had to find new and cheaper methods of running the blockade and
disrupting Allied trade abroad. The solution came in the form of the late nineteenth
century windjammer Pass of Balmaha, which was renamed the SMS Seeadler and
disguised as a neutral Norwegian timber transport captained by Count Felix von Luckner.
His boisterous personality and years of experience on sailing ships made him the perfect
fit, and the ship was fitted out to have room for twenty seven men who could speak
Norwegian in an easily accessible area for inspection, while the rest of the sixty four man
crew and room for four hundred prisoners were hidden below.
Leaving Germany at the end of December 1916, a run of good luck allowed the
Seeadler to successfully pass through the British minefields, blockade, and inspections to
begin her career raiding in the Atlantic in 1917. As a disguised sailing ship with two
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secret diesel motors, the Seeadler moved towards sailing and steam ships as a Norwegian
vessel, but would reveal herself as a ship of the Kaiser’s Navy before firing across the
bows of her prey. Count von Luckner understood that the first time he had to release the
prisoners from the prize ships, or accidently stopped a neutral ship that was free to leave
under the rules of war, the ruse of the wooden commerce raider would be revealed—
hence the continued use of the Norwegian disguise and room for four hundred
prisoners—and worked cautiously for months. After accidently capturing the Dutch ship
Viking, the Seeadler could have sunk it, but this would have been a breach of the rules of
war and could result in imprisonment or worse after the war ended, so they finally ran for
Cape Horn. The prisoners were treated very well, although two female passengers had
been terrified of the ‘dangerous Huns’ when they were first taken, and the French
captains despised their German captors when the truth was revealed, with one breaking
his parole to sketch the forward magazines for Allied use once he was released.
When it was time to release the prisoners, the sketches were taken and the French
captain allowed to leave with the rest, although he complained of his treatment to the
papers when they landed at Rio de Janeiro, even though the others said they had been
treated with the utmost respect. Evading the British Navy, the Seeadler only caught three
American ships in the Pacific—after the US had entered the war—adding another female
passenger who told the papers that she was treated incredibly well by every German
aboard when she returned home. Needing a rest and fresh food to prevent scurvy and
agitation among the crew and prisoners, von Luckner set out for the French island
Mopelia and arrived on 31st July 1917. Unfortunately for the raider, it was wrecked on
the coral reefs on 2nd August, the third anniversary of the Russian declaration of war, and
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had to be abandoned. The Americans and Germans worked together to make a small
shantytown on the island and lived well, while the populations of Europe continued to be
radicalized against one another as the rules of war were continuously broken.
Count von Luckner attempted to emulate the journey of the Emden’s landing
crew, and successfully traveled over two thousand miles in an open-deck sailing vessel,
but was captured and imprisoned in New Zealand. When first imprisoned, his capture
was kept secret by the New Zealand government from their own people to keep him safe,
because they were furious over the rumors that the Seeadler had sunk a missing troop
transport and let every man aboard drown—where in truth they had been captured by the
SMS Wolf. It was only after successfully escaping imprisonment with several German
Samoans for a few days that New Zealanders’ opinions of him changed from anger to
folk-legend status, and he was used by the press to exemplify their own military’s
incompetence. It was because of his determination and the chivalrous conduct with which
the Seeadler’s crew conducted itself towards their prisoners that they garnered as much
attention from the international press as they did—although always qualified by the
account of a discontent captain or two. By directing themselves fully within the rules of
war and with proper tact, the story of the Seeadler stood out in 1917 as a relic of the
expectations many in Europe had held for a war between the civilized European
superpowers at the start of 1914, which had diminished significantly by then.
When the final days of the war were closing, polarized hatred and plans for
revenge occupied the minds of many politicians and populations across the world, proven
by the divisive figure Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and his racially mixed Schutztruppe in
east Africa, which was never formally defeated before the signing of the Armistice.
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Always aware of the fact that the German colonies’ fates would be decided on the
battlefields of Europe in a war between the imperial powers, von Lettow set to work in
German East Africa establishing a force of German officers and African Askari that could
live off the land and utilize guerilla tactics when needed. At the start of the war, German
East Africa was surrounded to the north by British Uganda, west by the Belgian Congo,
south by then neutral Portuguese Mozambique, and along the coast by the British Navy.
Knowing this, von Lettow took the fight over the British and Belgian borders to force the
Allies to send troops and materials away from Europe to stop him.
Hardly concerned about the war in Africa, the British Admiralty sent Indian
troops to the city of Tanga in the north-west of the German colony under a racist leader,
who held that Indian troops were superior to African ones due to a combination of race
and colonial masters. The Indian forces had little experience and were treated terribly by
their leaders, leading to an easy full repulsion by the Schutztruppe’s smaller force and
requiring the British to censor the matter as best they could across their Empire, made
easier by the few German radio stations that existed in Africa at the time. As more troops
and machinery poured into the east African conflict, von Lettow and his officers
continued to evade or slip through pincer movements made for the battlefields of Europe,
and adapted to new weaponry that was used against them when necessary. The
Schutztruppe was finally chased to the southern border along Allied Portuguese
Mozambique near the end of 1917, then crossed the divide to continue raiding and
diverting Allied personnel and supplies from Europe outside their colony.
The newspapers of the Allied nations, which also included the United States then,
were highly critical of the continued fighting in east Africa, claiming that all von Lettow
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and the Schutztruppe were doing was wasting additional lives in a hopeless battle.
However, his goal had not been to gain new territory in Africa or even to protect the
colony until it was lost, but rather to continue acting as a thorn in the Allies’ side and
bleed it dry while Germany continued the fight in Europe. While moving around the east
African colonies and picking off Allied soldiers and porters, the governments of the
world were planning for reparations at the end of the war, with Allied papers reporting
that not one inch of the German colonies could ever be returned for fear of a second war,
and German politicians proposing the creation of the continent spanning colony of
Mittelafrica after they defeated the Allies. When the Armistice went into effect, it
included a section giving additional time to the Allies for finding and informing von
Lettow that the war had ended, making him the only German General never to be
defeated in the field during the war. While hated by the Allies, he and the Schutztruppe
were celebrated as military heroes when they returned to Germany in 1919,
demonstrating the stark difference of opinion that had opened between the two sides in
Europe five years after the conflict had begun.
There were two main reasons why these groups received the widespread attention
that they did throughout the war: first, they were examples of the war outside of the
European theater; second, they showed the type of warfare that many had expected from
the European superpowers before August 1914. When the war on the Western Front
ground to a halt in 1914 and 1915, and the Eastern Front was moving slowly and brutally,
news of the fighting in the rest of the world caught many people’s attention. The larger
naval conflicts, such as the German Navy’s East Asia Squadron being sunk off the
Falklands at the end of 1914, showed that the world war was truly global, and the SMS
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Emden’s raiding in the Indian Ocean beforehand emphasized this point. The success of
the landing party in taking the Ayesha and Choising across the hostile Indian Ocean after
the Emden’s defeat solidified the story of their daring, cunning, and courtesy. Although
Germany, their allies, and the neutral nations took great interest in their journey, by the
time of their arrival in Constantinople the unchanging and inconclusive nature of the war
in Europe had begun to demonstrate the growing divide between the people of the two
sides involved.
By 1917, the use of less humane weaponry and tactics that targeted civilian
lives—including tanks, flamethrowers, poison gas, starvation blockades, and U-Boat
attacks without thought of saving survivors afterwards—resulted in few press releases
praising chivalrous actions by members of the other side in Europe, or by many neutral
papers either. The use of the old windjammer SMS Seeadler for raiding in the Atlantic
and Pacific was conceived by the German Admiralty for cost and espionage reasons, but
the conduct of the Captain and crew aboard towards their surprised prisoners, despite
initial reservations, worked as a mostly positive propaganda tool for the German Empire
abroad. The attention the Seeadler received was in part because of its romanticized status
as a sailing raider, its gentlemanly conduct, and the success story that many people had
expected to come out of a modern European war in 1914, during an era when Europeans
were supposedly spreading the ideas of civilization and humanity to the people of the
world, instead of killing each other by the millions.
The Schutztruppe showed how deep the hatred ran by the end of the war, despite
having begun fighting at about the same time the conflict in Europe had begun. The news
in Europe from Africa was heavily slanted in the Allies’ favor because of their ability to
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disrupt German communications and support from reaching the colonies, which was what
allowed the failure at Tanga to be censored so well. When the stalemate in the North Sea
and on the fields of Europe led to the British government spreading the news of Paul von
Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces being pushed out of the final German colony in Africa, there
was little interest in the Allied press for praising the Schutztruppe’s successes from 1914
through November 1917. Although no longer in German East Africa, the Schutztruppe
did not surrender, but continued to fight to the dismay and agitation of the Allies, while
giving confidence to the people of Germany that their men were still fighting strong—the
same people who threw a parade for their return to Berlin in 1919.
The actions of the Emden, the landing crew that took the Ayesha, and the Seeadler
and her Captain were recognized at the time for their success in combat, evasion, and
kindness which were in increasingly short supply elsewhere in the war. The focus they
received from the international press highlights the type of warfare that many had been
expecting, and were intrigued by the longer the war stretched on, even months and years
after their journeys had ended. Part of the reason why the Schutztruppe had not received
any praise in 1914 was because its successes were largely censored by the Allies that
surrounded it, although the disclosure of their actions in 1917 and 1918 demonstrate how
polarized the two sides had become against one another during the final year of the
conflict. The deep-rooted anger that permeated European society after the war and peace
treaty is often studied in the buildup to the Second World War, but how it escalated
during the First World War contextualizes the thoughts of those who lived through it, and
the internationally recognized odysseys of the war help to reveal their pride, anger, and
aspirations for the future.
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